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INTRODUCTION 
In a society saturated with images that intertwine beauty and youth with 
personal improvement and individual happiness, it is not surprising that the 
United States has developed into a culture of body modification.1 United States 
consumers spend billions of dollars trying to modify their bodies superficially 
through cosmetics and toiletries2 or invasively through increasingly popular 
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 1. See MICHAEL ATKINSON, TATTOOED: THE SOCIOGENESIS OF A BODY ART 3–4 (2003); CLINTON 
R. SANDERS, CUSTOMIZING THE BODY: THE ART AND CULTURE OF TATTOOING 3, 6–7 (1989) (noting that 
Western culture constantly pursues body modification with a proliferation of body modification 
services from haircuts to diet centers and surgery aimed at changing our corporeal selves and 
therefore purportedly bettering our lives overall). 
 2. Americans are increasingly willing to spend top dollar for beauty with high-end or 
“prestige” products, topping $8 billion in 2005, although this figure only accounts for about one-
third of all makeup, fragrance, and skin-care retail sales. Press Release, The NDP Group, Prestige 
Beauty Industry Reaches Record High $8 Billion (Apr. 13, 2006), http://press.npd.com/dynamic/ 
releases/press_060413.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). In an aging population, sales of anti-aging 
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cosmetic surgery procedures.3 Reality television programs extol the virtues of 
makeovers, plastic surgery, and tattoos.4 The once-static boundaries of one’s 
biological sex have become further mutable through dress, grooming, and 
surgical or medical means.5 Both men and women have become caught up in 
this drive to change their bodies6 and to forge “new and improved” identities 
throughout their lives.7 
In this shape-altering environment, there is increasing societal interest in 
body modification8 through tattoos,9 body piercing,10 and other forms of body 
 
facial-care products rose thirty-three percent in 2005, compared to basic skin-care products, which 
increased four percent in 2005. Id. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 3. Current figures indicate that Americans spent over $12 billion on cosmetic procedures in 
2005. The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, 2005 Cosmetic Surgery National Data Bank 
(2005), http://www.surgery.org/download/2005stats.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 
Cosmetic Surgery National Data Bank]. Between 1997 and 2005, there has been a 444% increase in 
cosmetic surgery procedures. Id. 
 4. Television shows like ABC’s Extreme Makeover, http://abc.go.com/primetime/extreme 
makeover/, Fox Reality Channel’s The Swan, http://www.foxreality.com/shows.php?storyid=1062, 
and E!’s Dr. 90210, http://www.eonline.com/on/shows/dr90210/, trumpet the benefits of plastic 
surgery, while Oprah, http://www.oprah.com/index.jhtml, and other talk shows commonly feature 
weight-loss and grooming and fashion makeovers. The lives of tattoo artists and their patrons are 
chronicled on TLC’s Miami Ink, http://tlc.discovery.com/fansites/miami-ink/miami-ink.html, and 
A&E’s Inked, http://www.aetv.com/inked/index.jsp. See also generally THE GREAT AMERICAN 
MAKEOVER: TELEVISION, HISTORY, NATION (Dana Heller ed., 2006) (tracing the historical roots of the 
makeover mythos in the United States and examine Reality TV programs as new iterations of that 
original mythos); MAKEOVER TELEVISION: REALITIES REMODELED (forthcoming Dana Heller ed., 2007) 
(analyzing the international explosion of the makeover genre of Reality TV, looking especially at the 
way such TV texts aim to remodel “reality”). 
 5. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex 
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1995). In the context of transgendered persons, Prof. Franke 
states that there is a “tension between immutability, body, sex, and gendered identity. According to 
the traditional view, the sexed body—one’s inside—is immutable, whereas gender identity—one’s 
outside—is mutable. Yet for the transgendered person, the sexed body—one’s outside—is regarded 
as mutable while one’s gendered identity—one’s inside—is experienced as immutable.” Id. See also 
infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 6. Although female consumers dominate the cosmetics and skin care markets, the sales of 
men’s skin care products are advancing at a faster pace than those for women, up thirteen percent in 
2004. Male vanity spurs development of skin care, MSNBC.com July 19, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/8631299 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). See also supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. See also 
generally SANDERS, supra note 1, at 3–20 (reviewing historical and sociological aspects of appearance 
alteration from impermanent fashions and body painting to permanent tattoos, scarification, and 
piercings). 
 7. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 4. Prof. Atkinson discusses Shilling’s earlier sociological research 
which “conceptualized body modification as intentionally designed ‘projects’” that “are integral in 
formulating identity over the life course.” Id. He added that Shilling viewed bodies as existing “in a 
continual process of becoming—as their sizes, shapes, appearances, and contents are subject to 
ongoing transformation.” Id. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 8. Natasha Chilingerian, Fashion replaces rebellion as motive for body piercing, OR. DAILY 
EMERALD, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://www.dailyemerald.com/media/storage/paper859/ 
news/2003/11/26/Pulse/Fashion.Replaces.Rebellion.As.Motive.For.Body.Piercing-1982697.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2006); Marilyn Rauber, Tattoos finding wider appeal, MEDIA GEN. NEWS SERV., June 
26, 2005, available at http://www.potomacnews.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WPN%2FMG 
Article%2FWPN_BasicArticle&c+MGArticle&cid=1031783508783&path= (last visited Oct. 15, 2006); 
Regina M. Robo, Body Art in the Workplace, http://www.salary.com/advice/layoutscripts/advl_ 
display.asp?tab=adv&cat=nocat&ser=Ser64&part=Par140 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
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manipulation.11 Body modification has traditional roots in the spiritual and 
cultural practices of many ancient and present-day civilizations.12 Often viewed 
as primitive and barbaric in Western society, body modification has long been 
relegated to lower-status or “out” groups in the United States.13 Yet, the current 
revival in body modification cuts across a broad range of socio-economic classes 
and age groups,14 with many individuals desiring to express their personal, 
 
 9. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 30–50 (providing a historical overview of tattooing 
in Western culture); KARL GRÖNING, BODY DECORATION: A WORLD SURVEY OF BODY ART (1998) 
(detailing body painting and tattooing in global cultures); SANDERS, supra note 1, at 9–20 (offering a 
summary of tattooing and piercing practices from ancient times to 1980s); TATTOO HISTORY, A 
SOURCE BOOK (Steve Gilbert ed., 2000) (providing an anthology of historical records about tattooing 
throughout world). Of the 1.3 million college graduates in 2005, about one in four have a tattoo. 
Rauber, supra note 8. According to a Mayo Clinic study, approximately twenty-three percent of 
university students have up to three tattoos. Id. 
 10. A Mayo Clinic research report found that over fifty percent of university students have at 
least one piercing that is not an ear piercing. Rauber, supra note 8. See also Chilingerian, supra note 8; 
SANDERS, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing tribal cultures and extensive infibulation or piercings of nose, 
cheeks, nipples, and genitals as not only decorative, but also as symbolizing social status). See supra 
note 8 and accompanying text. See infra notes 11, 76, 82 and accompanying text. 
 11. See SANDERS, supra note 1, at 8–9 (author notes scarification (cutting and subsequent keloid 
formation) as symbols of tribal membership, adult maturity, preventive medicine, beauty, courage, 
or endurance). Scarification is still practiced in some African nations, signifying one’s social, 
spiritual, and political status. Helen Coleman, Scarification among African cultures (November 
2002), http://www.randafricanart.com/Scarification_and_Cicatrisation_among_African_cultures. 
html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006); University of Penn. Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 
Bodies of Cultures, A World Tour of Body Modification, http://www.museum.upenn.edu/new/ 
exhibits/online_exhibits/body_modification/bodmodpierce.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter Bodies of Cultures]. 
Another form of body modification is tongue splitting in which the tongue appears in a forked 
manner. Chilingerian, supra note 8. In Cloutier v. Costco, 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d on 
other grounds, 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004), the District Court discussed other body manipulation 
practices in considering a religious discrimination claim. The court stated that “[a]mong the 
practices of members . . . are body modifications such as piercing, tattooing, branding, transdermal 
[piece of metal that goes underneath and comes through skin] or subcutaneous implants, [stainless 
steel inserted under skin] and body manipulation, such as flesh hook suspensions and pulling.” Id. 
at 193 (citations omitted and alterations added). See infra notes 160–182 and accompanying text. 
 12. Bodies of Cultures, supra note 11. Nose rings were common in ancient Mexico and India while 
the indigenous Alaskans pierced their lips with lip-plugs called labrets. Id. Chilingerian, supra note 8. 
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See infra notes 105–129, 160–201 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 59–74 and accompanying text. 
 14. Body modification, especially tattoos and piercings, has broadened its appeal to more 
diverse age and social ranges in the United States. Anthony Jude Picchione, Tat-Too Bad for 
Municipalities: Unconstitutional Zoning of Body-Art Establishments, 84 B.U. L. REV. 829, 833 (2004); 
Chilingerian, supra note 8; Rauber, supra note 8. In a 2003 Harris Poll, it was determined that sixteen 
percent of all United States. adults having at least one tattoo, with thirty-six percent of adults aged 
twenty-five to twenty-nine and twenty-eight percent of adults aged thirty to thirty-nine possessing 
at least one tattoo. Laurel A. Van Buskirk, New Developments on Tattoos and Body Piercing in the 
Workplace, N.H. BUS. REV., Dec. 2005, at n.1, available at http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/ 
employment/tattoos2.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). See also Paul Andrew Burnett, Comment: 
Fairness, Ethical, And Historical Reasons For Diversifying The Legal Profession With Longhairs, The 
Creatively Facial-Haired, The Tattooed, The Well-Pierced, And Other Rock And Roll Refugees, 71 UMKC L. 
REV. 127 (2002) (recommending promotion of and greater tolerance for appearance diversity in legal 
profession, including lawyers with visible tattoos and piercings, to better serve diverse public). 
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cultural, religious, or gender identities through body modification.15 Some body-
modified women see their practices through a gendered lens as a mechanism for 
personal liberation from patriarchal standards of acceptable female beauty and 
sexuality.16 
In seeking to maintain control over employee appearance, employers have 
adopted formal and informal “body art work rules” in workplace dress and 
grooming codes that restrict or prohibit body modification.17 Typically, courts 
have given employers great latitude in adopting dress and grooming codes, 
elevating the regulation of employee appearance to a fundamental part of the 
employer’s prerogatives or discretion in operating the business.18 In an effort to 
avoid legal challenges, employers typically claim neutral reasons, such as 
maintaining a professional image, for their dress and grooming codes.19 
Employees often chafe at these restrictions, which appear to have almost no 
meaningful connection to the successful performance of their jobs, with some 
 
 15. Chilingerian, supra note 8; Rauber, supra note 8; Robo, supra note 8. See infra notes 105–29, 
160–201, 238–81 and accompanying text. 
 16. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 16–17. In summarizing feminist research, Prof. Atkinson 
states that “the female body is socially constructed, monitored, regulated, and maintained according 
to dominant notions of femininity” that emphasize the notion that woman’s bodies are “both passive 
and powerless.” Id. at 16. Therefore, women who undertake body modification are often seeking “to 
subvert dominant gender codes” and to empower themselves through “self-exploration and 
personal emancipation” from patriarchal control over their bodies. Id. at 16–17. See infra notes 85–94 
and accompanying text. 
 17. See Randy Dotinga, Branded in the workplace, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2004, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0913/p13s02-wmgn.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006); 
Louis Pechman, Tattoos and Piercings in the Workplace, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 2005, at 4; Andrea K. 
Johnstone & Laurel A. Van Buskirk, Tattoos & Body Piercing: Avoiding Employment Discrimination 
Claims, N.H. BUS. REV., Oct. 2004, available at http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/employment/ 
tattoo.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006); Van Buskirk, supra note 14. See infra notes 111–23, 160–69, 185–
94, 241–59, 269–81 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation 
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 350–52 (1997); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial 
and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1244–47 
(2004); Karl E. Klare, The Politics of Gender Identity: Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1400–01 (1992); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex 
Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, NW. U. SCH. OF L.: PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
PAPERS 1, 62 http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/plltp/art15 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). See infra notes 
98–104 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Engle, supra note 18, at 329–30; Rich, supra note 18, at 1136–39, 1207, 1249; Yuracko, supra 
note 18, at 62, 65. In the past, some employers would contend that their codes were based on their 
neutral desire to appeal to and improve their revenues from their customers, which courts have 
rejected at times when protected classes, especially gender, are at issue. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that customer preference cannot justify 
female over male flight attendants); Hylind v. Xerox Corp., 380 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2005) 
(holding that an assignment of female salesperson to customer who preferred females and openly 
discussed hobby of photographing partially nude women as gender discrimination); Ames v. 
Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that employer claims of customer 
preference for “pretty blonds” over male Filipino salesperson as adequate basis for gender and 
national origin discrimination case); EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 
1998) (restaurant may not hire only male waiters based on traditional perceptions of customer 
preference). See infra notes 99–102, 105–06, 116, 165 and accompanying text. 
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bringing discrimination claims under federal and state laws.20 Unlawful 
discrimination actions over body art work rules21 are the newest round in the 
battle over dress and grooming codes, following in the footsteps of more 
traditional legal actions based on gender attire, hair and beard lengths, and 
religious garb.22 
The social rewards and punishments for body modification practices are 
now being played out in the courts. Those people whose actions reflect and 
reaffirm dominant views of beauty and conformity to social roles are rewarded 
with public approval along with better jobs and pay scales in the workplace.23 
 
 20. Kelly Lucas, Should employers regulate appearance? While it is legal, many Americans do not 
believe employers should consider appearance when hiring, THE IND. LAW., May 4, 2005, reprints available at 
http://www.theindianalawyer.com; Rich, supra note 18, at 1245–46; Johnstone & Van Buskirk, supra 
note 17; Jerry Shottenkirk, Companies face social, legal challenges over evolving employee appearance 
policies, THE DAILY RECORD (Balt.), Apr. 15, 2005, reprints available at http://www.mddaily 
record.com; Get That Ring Out of Your Nose and Cut Your Hair—Can the Employer Legally Make Such 
Demands?, HR MANAGER’S LEG. RPTR., April 2002, available at http://www.rbpubs.com (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2006). There is a clear difference between employee and supervisor views on dress and 
grooming codes as found in a 2005 America at Work survey. In that poll, sixty-one percent of 
employees indicated that employers should not be allowed to deny employment based on 
appearance, including visible tattoos and piercings. However, forty-seven percent of supervisors 
held that employers should be able to deny employment based on appearance. Lucas, supra; 
Shottenkirk, supra. See infra notes 111–23, 160–82, 241–59 and accompanying text. 
 21. In a number of cases, employees have lost challenges to body art work rules based on illegal 
discrimination. See, e.g., Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. Civ. A. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 2000) (upholding policy prohibiting males from wearing earrings; finding no gender 
discrimination), aff’d, 251 F.3d 153 (3rd Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Riggs v. City of Fort 
Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that a police officer loses a challenge to 
department dress code requiring him to cover tattoos as race, gender, and national origin 
discrimination); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003) (finding that employee 
fails in challenge to policy prohibiting males from wearing earrings as gender discrimination); Sam’s 
Club, Inc. v. Madison EEOC, 668 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. App. 2003) (court sustains employer’s 
prohibition of nose rings against claim of appearance discrimination under state anti-discrimination 
law); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86-CV-1944, 1987 WL 9687 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) 
(court upholds employer policy prohibiting males from wearing earrings finding no gender 
discrimination), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision); In re Motion Picture 
& Television Fund & Hosp. SEIU, 103 Lab.Arb. 992 (1994) (Gentile, Arb.) (in arbitration, employee 
loses dispute with employer about removing nose ring, despite claims of national-origin 
discrimination and harassment). In only a handful of cases have employees won discrimination 
challenges to body art work rules. See also, e.g., Ciafrei v. Bentsen, 877 F. Supp. 788 (D.R.I. 1994) 
(finding for federal government when employee claims gender discrimination, due in part to her 
tattoos, in failure to promote dispute); EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 
2005 WL 2090677 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005); Hub Folding Box Co., Inc. v. MCAD, 750 N.E.2d 523 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a female employee wins challenge to employer mandate that 
female, but not male employee, cover tattoos in workplace). 
 22. See generally Gregory M. Baxter, Employers Beware, The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 
2000, 2 RUTGERS J. LAW & RELIG. 6, at 14–18 (2000/2001), http://org.law.rutgers.edu/publications/ 
law-religion/articles/RJLR_2_2_6.pdf; Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday, Workplace Religious 
Freedom in the New Millennium, 51 ME. L. REV. 341, 342, 344–46 (1999) (reviewing case law on 
traditional religious discrimination challenges based on hair, beard, and dress). See infra notes 111–
23, 160–82, 241–59 and accompanying text. 
 23. In general, people rank attractive people as having a host of positive qualities, including 
being perceived as smarter, healthier, more likeable, more honest and of higher moral character, 
often winning greater praise and remuneration for their work. Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance 
Matters: A Proposal To Prohibit Appearance Discrimination In Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 196–97 
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Those individuals who seek to define their own sense of beauty and identity are 
punished both socially and economically,24 with the assistance of the courts.25 
Except in rare instances, courts have played a key role in yielding virtually 
unilateral authority to employers to adopt dress and grooming codes, including 
prohibitions about various forms of body art and modification that exert social 
control over dress and grooming based on dominant views of acceptable 
appearance.26 
Despite properly performing their job tasks, employees find that employers 
and courts constantly demean and reject their efforts at racial, ethnic, and 
religious performance through body art and modification in the workplace, 
demanding a façade of cultural neutrality. Conversely, courts uphold employer 
mandates that require employees to follow dominant expectations of gender 
performance that emphasize gender differentiation. Rather than balance the 
interests of employers and employees, courts have primarily caved in to 
employer demands for proper gender roles, with gender performance now 
trumping job performance in the workplace. Courts need to refocus their 
analyses in discrimination cases dealing with dress and grooming codes to 
insure that these policies relate to actual job performance and provide fair 
opportunities for employees to choose whether or not they wish to perform their 
gender, racial, ethnic, or religious identities in the workplace. 
This article will consider the confluence of social constructions of race, 
gender, culture, class, sexuality, and religion that underwrite the terms of body 
art work rules. Part I will summarize the main social constructs associated with 
body modification in different cultures.27 The varied socio-historical 
constructions of body modification28 provide an important context for the 
consideration of current disputes over body art work rules. Part II will review 
the judicial tensions over whether to safeguard protected classes solely on the 
basis of biological or immutable traits or based on social constructions of 
protected classes.29 While courts have had little difficulty dismissing the 
performance of racial, cultural, and religious identities,30 the picture for gender 
claims is more mixed in disputes centered on body art work rules.31 In the 
context of a gendered workplace, this article will review how courts seem 
confused about whether to uphold or strike down body art work rules 
 
(2000); SANDERS, supra note 1, at 1; Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring Decisions: 
How Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 433 (2005). It is estimated that “attractive” employees earn about five percent 
more than “average”-looking employees and ten to fifteen percent more than “plain”-looking 
employees. Adamitis, supra, at 198. Applicants considered good-looking received salary offers that 
were eight to twenty percent higher than other applicants. Id. 
 24. See infra notes 241–59 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 111–23, 160–82, 241–59 and accompanying text. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part I and accompanying notes. 
 28. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 31. See infra Part II.C. 
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grounded in social norms about “proper” gender performance.32 Part III will 
discuss how the differential judicial treatment of gender performance in body 
modification disputes buttresses dominant views of appropriate appearance and 
perpetuates the promotion of the traditional workplace hierarchy that prizes the 
gender performance of dominant masculine traits, while subordinating the 
feminine.33 Part IV will call for a renewed judicial focus on job performance, 
rather than gender performance, in the review of dress and grooming codes, 
including body art work rules.34 
I. SOCIO-HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF BODY MODIFICATION 
Body modification is believed to date back to the late Stone Age with 
prehistoric tattoo practices.35 As body modification spread globally, these acts 
have fluctuated between positive and negative societal characterizations 
through the centuries.36 In the United States, body modification has traditionally 
been socially encoded as lower-status, deviant, or rebellious behavior;37 other 
cultures, however, take more positive views of body modification.38 Negative 
cultural associations on body art and modification in the United States are often 
derived from discrimination against “out groups” based on race, ethnicity, 
gender, and class. 
Body modification in the United States generally signifies one’s lower 
social status, a socio-historical perspective largely inherited from encounters of 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 9. Subsequently, tattooing became primarily associated with the 
Pacific cultures, such as the Maori and Samoan peoples, as well as native Alaskan cultures. Bodies of 
Cultures, supra note 11. 
 36. Sociologists contend that whether body modification practices are normative or deviant is 
“subject to social constructions and definitions (deviant or otherwise)” and are “influenced by the 
personal biographies of, collective world views held by, and contextual interpretations of 
individuals.” ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 56; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 20–21. In considering past 
sociological research, Prof. Atkinson suggests there is a need for more sociological research on social 
constructions of normative and deviant behavior in body modification practices. ATKINSON, supra 
note 1, at 56–57. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 37. Chilingerian, supra note 8; Rauber, supra note 8; Silja A. Tavi, Keeping Up Appearances, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11, 2000, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2000/0911/ 
p11s1.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). In reinforcing these stereotypes, courts have consistently 
upheld prosecutorial preemptory juror challenges of individuals with tattoos and piercings as 
nondiscriminatory, viewing these items as valid signs of nonconformity and liberal attitudes toward 
criminal behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 324 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (female with visible 
tattoos and lip piercing); Wilson v. State, Nos. 05-01-00999-CR, 05-01-01000-CR, 2003 WL 203470 
(Tex. App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2003) (African-American juror with visible body piercing); Lee v. State, 949 
S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App. Ct. 1997) (male juror with pierced earring); Gambel v. State, 835 S.W.2d 788 
(Tex. App. Ct. 1992) (male juror with pierced earring). In addition, a state appellate court upheld a 
school ban on male students’ wearing earrings, finding that earrings are appropriate attire only for 
females and that the rule prohibiting male earrings “discourages rebelliousness.” Hines v. Cason 
Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
 38. See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. 
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European explorers with tribal groups in the late 1700s.39 Europeans were both 
fascinated and repelled by the body art of tribal groups, especially that of 
Polynesian cultures.40 Coming from societies in which dress and grooming were 
tightly controlled, Europeans were shocked and frightened by these displays of 
exuberant self-expression and sexuality.41 European cultures viewed these 
societies as primitive and backward, and therefore their body modification 
practices as lower status within the social hierarchy.42 
From late 1700s to the early twentieth century, many native people were 
enslaved and displayed as “live savages,” freaks and oddities, initially for the 
racist entertainment of European aristocracy,43 and then eventually to the masses 
in museums, fairs, circuses, and carnival sideshows in Europe and the United 
States.44 In these settings, these indigenous peoples often served as a lower status 
contrast with the claimed higher status virtues of modern Western lifestyles 
marked by industrialism, scientific and technological development, and 
conservative moral codes about the proper display of the body.45 
Eventually, female tattooed attractions became hugely popular as a form of 
erotic peep show in the United States.46 In these shows, heavily-tattooed females 
partially stripped before huge crowds to display their tattoos, concocting wild 
stories of “savage” kidnappings and forced tattooing to explain their 
appearance.47 Embedded in these fanciful back-stories were the false 
assumptions that no woman would intentionally tattoo herself and that her own 
“natural” frailty would make her unable to fend off the attacks of dangerous 
primitives.48 These tattooed women created dual challenges to societal norms by 
 
 39. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 32–34; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 40. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 32–34; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 41. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 30–31; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14. 
 42. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 31, 33–34; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14–15. Tattooed native 
peoples were often killed, their heads taken as souvenirs of exotic travels in the 1800s. ATKINSON, 
supra note 1, at 32. 
 43. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 31; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14–15. In an effort to dabble in the 
exotic, some members of European nobility got tattoos to mark their travels to the east in the late 
nineteenth century, including the Czar of Russia, the kings of Greece, Sweden, and Germany, and all 
of the males in the British royal family. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 15. The trend was short-lived and 
American social elites snubbed the practice stating that tattooing “may do for an illiterate seaman, 
but hardly for an aristocrat.” Id. at 17–18. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
 44. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 31, 33–35; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 14–15, 18. See ROBERT W. 
RYDELL, ALL THE WORLD’S A FAIR 64–68 (1984) (looking at United States World’s Fairs, especially the 
racial hierarchies inherent in the layout of the Midway at the 1893 World’s Columbia Exposition, 
and the entertainment strip where “exotics” were displayed). 
 45. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 33–34 (discussing enslaved tribal peoples with tattoos being put 
on carnival and sideshow stages to represent “the savage tribal world” as “antithesis of modernity”). 
Heavily-tattooed non-native sailors soon followed suit, seeking to cash in on public fear of and 
fascination with tattoos, embellishing heroic tales of capture and forced tattooing in exotic lands. 
During the Depression, many poor non-native men and women tattooed their bodies in hopes of 
making money in circuses and freak shows. Id. at 34–35; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 15, 18. 
 46. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 37; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 18. 
 47. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 33. Prof. Atkinson states that tattooed women ultimately became 
the most profitable and highly-attended exhibitions. Id. 
 48. See infra notes 52–58, 85–90 and accompanying text. 
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both possessing tattoos normally associated with masculinity and by exposing, 
in a sexually titillating manner, so much of their bodies to audiences.49 
These shows provided an opportunity for the audience to explore 
“culturally repressed desires and emotions,” and “to experience subversive 
pleasures with and tortures of the flesh without sacrificing commonly held 
cultural understandings of corporeal responsibility” while affirming “dominant 
cultural ideas about sanctity of the body.”50 These carnival show settings also 
helped to embed negative stereotypes about women with tattoos as “loose” or 
“tramps,” labels that still persist in contemporary United States culture.51 
The circus show era, while a significant one, merely reinforced rather than 
originated the sexualization and subjugation of body-modified women in world 
cultures.52 While tattooed females in carnival sideshows intertwined female 
sexuality with female submission, other cultures have utilized practices that 
send these same messages in different ways. For example, for centuries, the 
Chinese aristocracy undertook the excruciatingly painful practice of binding 
each foot of a noblewoman so that it would fit into a man’s palm.53 Until the 
practice was outlawed in 1911,54 the bound foot, also called a “lotus foot,” was 
considered an “erogenous zone” for a male partner’s sexual pleasure. At that 
time, female aristocrats with unbound feet were considered unmarriageable 
 
 49. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 33. 
 50. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 36. 
 51. See infra notes 242, 251, 255 and accompanying text. See Mairs v. Gilbreath, No. Civ. A. 01-
9981-ABC (C.D. Cal. 2002) (court orders landlord to pay damages for refusing to rent to couple in 
which female partner had tattoos which landlord believed indicated that she was woman of low 
moral standards), cited in CA landlord who said tattoos are okay on male but not female tenants is ordered to 
pay $30,900, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ADVOCATE, Nov. 2002, at 2, available at http://www.fair 
housing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=advocate_november02_page2 (last visit-
ed Nov. 22, 2006); see also Press Release, National Fair Housing Advocate Online, Landlord Who 
Refused to Rent to Woman with Tattoo Must Pay $30,990 (Oct. 18, 2002), http://www.fairhousing.com 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
Prof. Sanders undertook extensive interviews of tattooed people to understand their motivations 
and the impact of their body art on their relationships with others. One female interviewee discussed 
the stereotypical response from her father upon learning about her tattoo. 
My father’s reaction was just one of disgust because women who get tattoos to him are . . . 
I don’t know . . . they just aren’t nice girls. They aren’t the type of girl he wants his 
daughter to be. He let me know that. He let me have it right between the eyes. He said, 
“Do you know what kind of girls get tattoos?” and he just walked out of the room. That 
was enough. He thought tramps get tattoos or girls that ride on the back seats of 
motorcycles. 
SANDERS, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
 52. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 9. In ancient Egypt, only women were tattooed, especially 
concubines, singers, dancers, and other female entertainers to signify their status as sexual or gaze 
objects of pleasure. Id. This group of females were typically tattooed with the symbol of the goddess 
Bes, who served to protect female entertainers. Id. Furthermore, in various cultures, body 
modification of females often served as a symbol of a woman’s sexual maturity and sexual 
availability. Id. at 6, 8–9. 
 53. Id. at 6–7; Marie Vento, One Thousand Years of Chinese Footbinding: Its Origins, Popularity and 
Demise (1998), http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/studpages/vento.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2006). 
 54. Vento, supra note 53. 
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outcasts in Chinese society.55 The erotic importance of the bound foot in early 
Chinese society led prostitutes, concubines, and transvestites to adopt the 
practice.56 The lotus foot intertwined the real physical incapacitation of women 
with the symbolic view of women as powerless objects of men’s sexual desires.57 
The bound foot also symbolized the need for women to suffer physically in 
order to attain dominant standards of physical beauty.58 
The lower status view of tattoos continued and fell into further disrepute 
when they gained popularity amongst lower-status or “out groups,” such as 
working-class men, prisoners, motorcycle gangs, and political protestors in the 
United States. During the 1920s–1950s, tattoo parlors became social centers for 
working-class men, 59 with tattoos becoming further identified with lower-status 
behavior,60 especially given that tattoo parlors were usually located in the less-
desirable urban neighborhoods.61 Tattoos garnered some respectability during 
this time period, however, when the markings displayed symbols of jingoistic 
patriotism in the face of two World Wars.62 That respectability was short-lived. 
After World War II, the push in United States society for middle-class values 
and conformity repositioned tattooing as base and undesirable lower-status 
behavior.63 
The persistent connection between tattoos and lower social status also can 
be traced to the long history of tattooing as a punitive and involuntary practice 
that permanently marks the bearer as a social deviant.64 The markings were 
intended to be punitive, a painful process that set an individual apart from 
respectable society with indelible symbols.65 As a sign of resistance, many 
prisoners remade the tattoos into their own designs, thereby reclaiming 
individual control over the punitive marking of their bodies.66 The popularity of 
tattoos still remains amongst prisoners today who voluntarily brand themselves 
 
 55. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6–7; Vento, supra note 53. 
 56. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 57. Id. at 6; Vento, supra note 53. 
 58. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6; Vento, supra note 53. 
 59. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 36–38; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 19. 
 60. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 36. 
 61. Id.; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 62. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 37. 
 63. Id. at 38, 41; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 18–19; Picchione, supra note 14, at 833. In summarizing 
the working class era, Prof. Sanders indicated that the middle-class negatively viewed tattoos “as a 
decorative cultural product dispensed by largely unskilled and unhygienic practitioners from dingy 
shops in urban slums.” Customers of tattoo parlors were denigrated as being “drawn from marginal, 
rootless, and dangerously unconventional social groups” that were seen as direct challenges to the 
“law-abiding, hard-working, family-oriented, and stable” members of the middle class. SANDERS, 
supra note 1, at 18–19. Consequently, tattoos were viewed as vulgar and immoral, with “the art of 
tattooing . . . [being] left up to the lower class; so it is a degraded art . . . gross and vile like every 
despised art.” Picchione, supra note 14, at 833 (alteration added). 
 64. In ancient Greece, Rome, England, France, and Japan, prisoners were branded with tattoos 
to mark them permanently as criminals and social deviants. Id. at 832; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 38; 
SANDERS, supra note 1, at 11–12. It is interesting to note that the Greeks referred to criminal tattoos as 
“stigma,” a term that often reflects western views of body modification practices. ATKINSON, supra 
note 1, at 38. 
 65. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 39. 
 66. Id. 
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to indicate gang affiliations or to signify their contempt for the prison 
experience.67 
Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, many motorcycle clubs or gangs, some 
members of whom had been imprisoned, also used tattoos to forge a group 
identity, their markings typically symbolizing rebellion against mainstream 
United States society.68 During that era, other disaffected groups began to 
embrace the outlaw image of body art to communicate their opposition to 
dominant codes of conduct in the United States.69 The image of body 
modification was further eroded by highly-questionable psychological and 
medical studies which painted those seeking tattoos as psychologically 
unstable.70 These biased studies also made the then “scandalous” assertion that 
those providing tattoos were either latent or openly homosexual men who 
sought out the erotic use of phallic needles as well as the “almost constant close 
proximity to the male body, which they can feel, stroke, and fondle without 
arousing suspicion.”71 
There is a historical association between tattooing and social protest in 
other world cultures, with the United States anti-war fervor and social 
consciousness initiated in 1960s reflecting the traditional role of tattoos as signs 
of discontent with prevailing political and social controls.72 During the Vietnam 
War era, those opposing the war marked themselves with peace signs or other 
emblems of the counter-culture movement, such as marijuana leaves, while 
those supporting the war sported patriotic tattoos.73 During this period, 
dominant views of race, ethnicity, gender, and class were questioned and 
subverted, and those individuals seeking to free themselves from oppressive 
cultural norms often engaged in self-expression and self-exploration through 
body modification practices.74 
Unlike the prevalent disdain in mainstream United States society, many 
ancient and contemporary world cultures view body art and modification as 
constructive and beneficial social practices. In these other cultures, tattoos and 
piercings are envisioned as positive symbols that exhibit group identity and 
define an individual’s place in a group’s social hierarchy.75 Oftentimes, the body 
 
 67. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 39. 
 68. Id. at 39–40. See also generally Ciafrei v. Bentsen, 877 F. Supp. 788 (D.R.I. 1994) (although 
dismissed based on sovereign immunity grounds, plaintiff asserted gender discrimination and 
harassment which included disparaging remarks such as referring to plaintiff as “Big Harley Mama 
with tattoos all over her body”). 
 69. Id. at 41. 
 70. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 36–38. Many early psychological studies lacked proper 
methodology with researchers, who had low regard for these practices, studying body modification 
amongst patients in mental institutions and then concluding that such behavior is deviant. Id. at 37. 
 71. Id. at 38–39. 
 72. Id. at 42–43; Picchione, supra note 14, at 833. The notion of tattoos as social protest dates back 
to ancient Greek history. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 42–43; Picchione, supra note 14, at 833. 
 73. Picchione, supra note 14, at 833. 
 74. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
 75. For example, in the Maori culture of New Zealand and the Dayaks of Borneo, both men and 
women were tattooed, with the most heavily-tattooed members being those with high social rank 
within the tribe. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 51–52; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 10–11. Subsequently, 
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modification process also signaled a rite of passage into adulthood and full 
membership into a tribe.76 In many tribal cultures, those becoming adults 
underwent arduous tattoo rituals, as the display of one’s tattoos signified an 
individual’s courage and endurance in undertaking the painful process. Tattoos 
became a source of personal and family pride as well as group identity.77 
Whether intended as recognition of one’s social status or a rite of passage, body 
modification was considered normative, not deviant, behavior in these tribal 
cultures.78 
Drawing on notions of courage and stoicism in the face of the physical pain 
associated with body modification, warrior or military groups during many 
historical periods have used tattoos as symbols of heroism, bravery, and 
patriotism.79 Body art has reemerged numerous times throughout military 
history,80 including as a staple practice among United States soldiers and sailors 
beginning in the Civil War era.81 Subsequently, military personnel have often 
used tattoos to identify their affiliations with a particular branch of the armed 
forces or, similar to earlier tribal cultures, to prove their masculinity in handling 
the painful process. 
Body modification has also been traditionally linked to sacred or religious 
devotion, with the wearer often seeking the protection of spiritual forces in this 
life and the afterlife.82 Tattoos were also often thought to be sacred talismans of 
 
Danish nobility tattooed their family crests on their arms as a display of their lineage. Picchione, 
supra note 14, at 831. 
 76. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 51–53; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 10–11. The Tchikrin culture of 
central Brazil, for example, pierced the ears of all children at birth and the lips of the males, 
replacing the latter in adulthood with more elaborate lip and penis piercings. SANDERS, supra note 1, 
at 8. 
 77. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 52–53. 
 78. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 52–53; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6. Prof. Sanders noted that 
“[p]ermanent body alteration and non-permanent corporeal adornment in both tribal and modern 
cultures share the rigorous social support of the bearer’s significant reference group.” SANDERS, 
supra note 1, at 6. 
 79. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 13–14; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 30, 36; Picchione, supra note 14, at 
832–33. Pre-dating the Roman Empire, the tribes of the British Isles used tattoos to offer a more 
fearsome appearance to potential attackers. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 13; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 
30. Roman soldiers who fought the early Britons took on the practice of tattoos until in the third 
century Emperor Constantine banned tattoos as violating God’s creation. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 
13. See Christine Braunberger, Sutures of Ink: National (Dis)Identification and the Seaman’s Tattoo, 31 
GENDERS (2000), http://www.genders.org/g31/g31_braunberger.html (charting the history of the 
seaman’s tattoo, arguing that it represented both conformity to and transgression of militaristic 
codes. As the seaman’s tattoo represented the performance of masculinity, it also suggested and 
anxiety about masculinity as a natural category. Id. By having to mark themselves to signify their 
masculinity, the men are admitting that their “maleness” is not readily apparent to the casual 
observer. Id. 
 80. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 13–15; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 36–37; Picchione, supra note 14, at 
832. 
 81. Picchione, supra note 14, at 832. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was estimated that 
approximately ninety-five percent of the United States infantry and ninety percent of sailors on 
United States battleships possessed tattoos. Id. 
 82. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 30; SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6, 11. The Aztecs and the Mayans 
pierced their ears to repel demons and their tongues to enhance communication with the gods. 
Chilingerian, supra note 8. Incan, Aztec, and Mayan mummies dating from the first century C.E. 
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good luck and integral to preserving one’s health, safety, youth, and 
attractiveness to potential mates.83 Even today, facial and hand tattooing is still 
common amongst nomadic Yemeni women to protect against diseases and to 
promote fertility.84 
Seizing on the positive connotations of these practices in tribal cultures, 
women turned, in the battle over identity politics in Western cultures, to tattoos 
and other forms of body modification to oppose dominant negative conceptions 
of women as frail and powerless.85 Examining extensive sociological research, 
Prof. Atkinson contends the following: 
Stressing the emancipatory nature of the tattoo, women highlighted how tattoos 
might be used as a means of permanently redesigning identity in a culture. The 
tattooed female form (outside of the highly sexualized, male-oriented circus 
show) articulated a voyage of empowerment and self-reclamation precisely 
because the tattoo was a pre-existing signifier of masculine deviance. . . . Like a 
pebble dropped in the middle of a placid pond, women’s involvement in the 
practice stirred ripples across the entire tattoo figuration. Indeed, women 
challenged but similarly breached the integrity of cultural associations between 
the tattoo and the working class male, the criminal, the sailor, the circus 
performer, the gang member and the biker.86 
Contravening the social constructions of lower class status and male 
deviance in the United States, middle-class suburban females are the fastest-
growing demographic for tattoos today.87 It is unclear whether this trend is 
precipitated by the desire for gendered emancipation or merely represents an 
overall need for greater self-exploration and self-expression, not limited to 
gender identity.88 Yet, even if women use body modification practices solely as 
 
show that tattooing was also a common practice in those societies. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 10. In 
the cultures of Fiji and Borneo, women wore tattoos to ensure immortality through a pleasant 
afterlife. Id. at 11. Fijian women believed that if they died without tattoos they would be beaten in 
the afterlife by other women and fed to the gods. Id. In Borneo, tribal women believed that, the more 
extensive their tattoos, the better tasks they would be assigned in the afterlife, such as collecting 
pearls from a heavenly river. Id. Those females without tattoos would be excluded from the afterlife. 
Id. Prior to and during the Crusades, Europeans used tattoos with religious imagery—i.e., 
crucifixes—to identify their religious affiliation and desires for a Christian burial should they die in 
battle. Id. at 13–14; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 30. Prior to the Crusades, the Catholic Church, since 
the time of the Emperor Constantine in the third century, had intermittently banned tattoos as signs 
of the devil and as desecrations of God’s corporeal handiwork. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 13. Some 
Christians remain hostile to tattoos and piercings as contravening the Old Testament admonition 
against cuttings and markings of the flesh. See Leviticus 19:28 (King James) (“Ye shall not make any 
cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you: I am the LORD.”). See infra notes 
160–94 and accompanying text. 
 83. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 3, 6; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 32. One of the earliest indications of 
sacred tattoos was excavated in the mummified body of an Egyptian priestess of Hathor, dated 
about 2000 B.C.E., with line markings on her stomach for medicinal and fertility purposes. SANDERS, 
supra note 1, at 9. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Id. at 16, 43. See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text. 
 86. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 43. 
 87. Picchione, supra note 14, at 833. 
 88. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 47–48 (asserting that current era focuses on self-expression 
and exploration rather than gendered identity politics); SANDERS, supra note 1, at 41–43 (contending 
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opportunities for further self-exploration and expression, untethered from 
gendered identity politics, such practices have an important value in the overall 
struggle of women to control their own bodies and determine their own choices 
in a society that often seeks to limit their options for self-determination.89 As 
body modification practices move toward more diverse audiences, it is unclear 
whether this trend will ultimately result in broader social acceptance or slip 
back into disrepute in the United States.90 
Disturbingly, women have also become the main consumers of more 
dramatic forms of body modification, involving a host of elective plastic or 
cosmetic surgeries.91 In some instances, women may undertake these elective 
procedures as part of a desire for control over their own bodies and self-
exploration with alternative selves,92 but this conduct is often aimed at appealing 
to dominant male views of physical beauty.93 Rather than being emancipatory or 
challenging the status quo, these surgeries may often reinforce either the 
historical subjugation of women as merely sexual or gaze objects—like tattooed 
 
that those seeking tattoos strive to define themselves with tattoos as part of their “personal identity 
kit”). 
 89. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 16–17, 42–43; David Cruz, Pursuing Equal Justice in the West: 
Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 250 (2004) (criticizing those who 
overemphasize false dichotomy of individual autonomy over inequality and subordination in 
discriminatory workplace dress codes; suggesting that liberty and equality are complementary 
goals). 
 90. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 57. Quoting Canadian commentator John Gray, Prof. 
Atkinson suggests we heed Gray’s warning against reading too much into the recent popularity of 
body modification practices, especially tattooing: “[A]ccording to the media, tattooing is about to go 
permanently mainstream. Don’t believe it. Rumours of imminent respectability have been chasing 
the tattoo for a century.” Id. 
 91. Women account for over ninety-one percent of cosmetic procedures with men trailing 
behind at a mere nine percent. Id. However, a 2005 survey of women and men indicated that they 
overall approve of cosmetic surgery, fifty-five percent and fifty-two percent, respectively, 
responding positively. Cosmetic Surgery National Data Bank, supra note 3, at 16. Furthermore, 
women (eighty-two percent) and men (seventy percent) indicated that they would not be 
embarrassed if people outside of their circle of family and close friends knew about their cosmetic 
surgery. Id. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text. In the United States, reality TV provides 
evidence for this point, as the willing participants do not mind having the large TV audience witness 
their surgical transformation. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 92. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 16–17. See also Kathryn Morgan, Women and the Knife: Cosmetic 
Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s Bodies, 6 HYPATIA 51–52 (1991) (noting that plastic surgery is 
only a choice for those with financial means). Morgan implies that conformity to normative body 
assumptions is sometimes class-inflected, and hence is not always a “choice” open to everyone. Id. 
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 93. Morgan, supra note 92, at 51–52; Anne Balsamo, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE GENDERED BODY: 
READING CYBORG WOMEN 78 (1996) (contending that women are pressured to turn their bodies into 
remodeling projects and to transform their bodies to comply with traditional notions of femininity); 
Suzanne Fraser, COSMETIC SURGERY, GENDER, AND CULTURE 23 (2003) (examining the role of plastic 
surgery in producing the “properly” gendered body); SANDERS, supra note 1, at 7. In analyzing 
feminist sociological research, Prof. Atkinson indicates that conduct such as excessive dieting and 
breast augmentation “are best viewed as exaggerated or caricatured expressions of dominant ideals 
of the female body . . . and existing relations of power in excess.” ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 16. Prof. 
Sanders also notes that individuals most often engage in plastic surgery either to meet a socially-
approved range of physical beauty or to distance themselves from identification with lower status 
ethnic groups, or both. SANDERS, supra note 1, at 7. 
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women in carnival sideshows—or the notion that women must suffer physically 
in order to attain dominant standards of physical beauty—similar to earlier foot-
binding practices in China. In these instances, female body modification is 
viewed as socially acceptable conduct because it complies with dominant ideals 
of female beauty and perpetuates the existing power relations in society.94 While 
United States society may support body modification practices for women that 
conform to dominant standards of female beauty, females displaying their 
piercings and tattoos certainly do not receive the same level of social approval; 
their body modifications are often categorized as masculine signifiers and 
consequently, as a deviance from their expected gender roles. 
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF PROTECTED CLASSES AND BODY ART WORK RULES 
Although body modification typically serves decorative functions,95 these 
practices also historically play important roles in the identity politics of race, 
ethnicity, and gender.96 Clearly, many employers view body modification as a 
voluntary act that subverts the status quo, leading to the adoption of restrictive 
body art work rules. Challenges to these rules have become intertwined with 
issues of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender. In these cases, the courts have 
wrestled with traditional anti-discrimination jurisprudence about whether or 
not to safeguard only immutable or natural traits (status) or broaden protections 
to mutable or voluntary characteristics (conduct). Within this context, courts 
struggle with the application of same or different treatment in either upholding 
the status quo or allowing anti-discrimination law to challenge it. Some of the 
earlier stereotypes concerning body modification discussed in Part I reemerge 
when these disputes become interwoven with social constructions of protected 
classes.97 
A. Rejecting Racial and Ethnic Performance in Body Art Work Rules Cases 
In dress and grooming disputes involving race and ethnicity, courts have 
been largely unwilling to allow employees to perform their racial and cultural 
identities through voluntary choices (conduct) in grooming and dress, unless the 
conduct can be attached to some biological or immutable trait (status).98 For 
example, courts have routinely upheld employer grooming codes that ban all-
braided hairstyles as expressions of racial or cultural identity deferring to the 
employer’s contention that this style does not project a professional or 
 
 94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 95. See SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6; Picchione, supra note 14, at 832. 
 96. See SANDERS, supra note 1, at 6; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 42–43. In sociological terms, 
“identity politics’ involves “the process of aligning oneself with others who intersubjectively share 
feelings of marginality and oppression.” Id. In the contemporary world, Prof. Atkinson contends that 
the body has become “a popular billboard for ‘doing’ identity politics” grounded in issues of race, 
gender, and sexuality. Id. at 42. For these groups, the body is a basis for “cultural exploration [for] 
those ultimately committed to challenging dominant social codes found in the body a highly 
political means of expressing and recreating identity.” Id. 
 97. See infra Parts II.A–C. 
 98. Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 329–30; Rich, supra note 18, at 1138–40; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 
65. 
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“business-like” image.99 Without assessing underlying stereotypes, courts in 
these cases have declared that employer grooming codes are neutral since they 
are being applied equally to all races and sexes.100 However, courts have 
remarked that efforts to ban “natural” hairstyles, such as an Afro would be 
impermissible discrimination since these traits are natural and not volitional.101 
Therefore, unless a “natural” hairstyle or morphological marker is at issue, 
courts reject employees’ desires to perform their racial or ethnic identities as 
merely personal preferences that are not safeguarded under anti-discrimination 
law.102 
Issues of racial and ethnic performative acts have been raised in cases 
questioning employer body art work rules. In both cases that follow, the 
employees are associating piercings and tattoos with tribal identity or 
membership; in one instance, Mayan, and the second, Celtic. As indicated in 
Part I, body modification has positive connotations in many tribal cultures, 
emphasizing tribal membership and identity.103 Both cases involve employees 
who are properly performing their jobs, but are nonetheless punished for their 
body modification, which the employers view as lower-status behaviors.104 
In Motion Picture and Television Fund,105 an arbitrator considered an 
employee’s claim that her employer’s body modification rules violated Title VII 
as to national origin. The employee, a PBX operator who also served from time 
to time as a receptionist with public contact, was of Mexican descent with roots 
 
 99. Engle, supra note 18, at 329–30; Rich, supra note 18, at 1136–39; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 62, 
65. See McBride v. Lawstaf, No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (upholding 
employment agency ban on braided hairstyle as not race discrimination); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding no racial discrimination on braided hairstyle ban, 
because that style was artificial and not a product of natural hair growth, as found with “Afro/bush 
style”); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698, 700 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1981) 
(upholding workplace ban on beaded hair against claim of race discrimination contrasted with 
natural afro or braided styles). 
 100. Engle, supra note 18, at 320, 327, 332–35; Rich, supra note 18, at 1194–96; Yuracko, supra note 
18, at 61–64. 
 101. Engle, supra note 18, at 329–30; Rich, supra note 18, at 1136–39. 
 102. Engle, supra note 18, at 335; Klare, supra note 18, at 1400–01; Rich, supra note 18, at 1224–25. 
Prof. Klare argues that there is a disconnect in judicial decisions between employee choices in dress 
and grooming being viewed as trivial as contrasted with employer prerogatives to regulate dress 
and grooming as critical. He notes that judicial decisions become “eerily apocalyptic when judges 
get to the part of their opinion where they uphold, as they usually do, the power of employers, 
school administrators, and others to visit severe penalties on people who wear nonconforming dress 
or hairstyles.” He adds that civilization will not fall to pieces merely because a man might wear long 
hair or a woman might wear a pair of pants. He concludes that “judges create a peculiar dissonance 
by trivializing appearance claims while at the same time asserting the need for the authorities to 
possess vast powers to enforce conventional attitudes and prejudices.” Klare, supra note 18, at 1400–
01. 
 103. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 39–74 and accompanying text. 
 105. 103 Lab. Arb. 992 (1994) (Gentile, Arb.), cited in Carey R. Butsavage, Application of “External 
Law” to Contractual Arbitration, A Survey of Recent Cases 9–10, 2001 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMP. L., 
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/eeo/2001/butsav.doc (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). See also 
Sam’s Club, Inc. v. Madison EEOC, 668 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. App. 2003) (upholding employer’s 
prohibition of nose rings for all employees based on company’s conservative image against claim of 
appearance discrimination under state anti-discrimination law). 
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that could be traced to the Mayan culture. She wore a small silver nose ring as 
an expression of her Mexican culture—Stingray Spine Paddler, a Mayan god, 
also traditionally wore such a piercing. The employer claimed that her facial 
piercing violated the company dress code and sought to bar her from wearing 
the piercing, claiming it was “inappropriate” for the workplace. In addition, the 
employer made repeated demands that she provide evidence of the historical 
and cultural symbolism of her piercing. There was no claim that the employee 
was deficient in performing any of her job tasks, only concerns about her 
performing her national origin identity.106 
She complained that the grooming policy was national origin 
discrimination and included a claim of ethnic harassment based upon the 
employer’s treatment of her regarding the cultural value of her piercing.107 
Relying on prior case precedent, the arbitrator stated that Title VII “does not 
protect the ability of workers to express their cultural heritage at the 
workplace.”108 Based on grooming cases concerning racial performative acts, the 
arbitrator also asserted that Title VII “is concerned only with disparities in the 
treatment of workers; it does not confer substantive privileges.”109 In addition, 
the arbitrator found that the employer’s conduct did not amount to 
harassment.110 
In Riggs v. City of Fort Worth,111 a bicycle police officer, a white male of Celtic 
descent, challenged, based on gender, race, and national origin (as well as a 
violation of his First Amendment rights), his employer’s efforts to require him to 
cover up his tattoos112 with long sleeves and pant legs.113 At the time of his action, 
the city had no policy banning tattoos and the employee had been successfully 
performing his job as a bicycle patrol officer in short pants and shirt sleeves.114 
Originally, the department had no issue with the officer’s tattoos, but things 
 
 106. 103 Lab. Arb. at 992, cited in Butsavage, supra note 105. See supra notes 75–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. 103 Lab. Arb. at 992. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 992 (quoting Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993)). The 
arbitrator cited cases that found that racial performative acts are not protected under Title VII. The 
arbitrator also cited Brown v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding 
discharge of male employees who refused to comply with facial hair policy, which they viewed as an 
“extreme and gross suppression of them as black men and a badge of slavery”) and Rogers v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that ban on all-braided hairstyles was not race 
discrimination, despite employee contentions of African-American cultural and historical 
identification). 
 110. 103 Lab. Arb. at 992. 
 111. 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 112. Id. at 574–75. Riggs’s tattoos included Celtic tribal symbols from wrist to shoulder on both 
arms, his wife’s name on his right arm, a mermaid from knee to his waist, his family crest on his 
chest, the Cartoon character Jessica Rabbit on his forearm, and a two-foot by two-foot full-color 
illustration of St. Michael slaying Satan on his back. Id. at 577. 
 113. Id. at 577, 581. In Riggs, it is interesting to note that the plaintiff did not claim religious 
discrimination for the employer’s grooming policy, perhaps because the religious tattoo—St. 
Michael slaying Satan—was already covered on his back regardless of shirt-sleeve length. Id. at 578. 
 114. Id. at 574, 577. 
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changed when the officer had properly towed an illegally-parked car that 
turned out to be the mayor’s vehicle.115 
About a month after the towing incident, the plaintiff received a letter from 
the chief requiring him to wear long sleeve shirts and pants to cover his tattoos, 
which were now viewed as detracting “from the professionalism of a Fort Worth 
police officer.”116 Complying with this new-found concern, he wore long-sleeved 
shirts and long pants and three times suffered from heat exhaustion.117 His 
physician ordered that he not wear long sleeves in temperatures over ninety 
degrees.118 While assigned to desk duty, he claimed that the chief told him he 
would never be allowed off desk duty or promoted because of his tattoos.119 He 
was transferred off the bike unit, which he believed was a form of demotion; he 
asserted that later promotional opportunities were denied him because of his 
tattoos.120 
The officer supplied the court with a list of fifteen other police officers with 
their sexes, races, and the locations of their tattoos.121 These other officers had not 
been required to cover their tattoos, and the plaintiff claimed gender, race, and 
national origin discrimination.122 Even though the unwritten policy was not 
applied to other officers, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to 
show that the chief had intentionally discriminated against him based on any 
protected classes.123 
Regarding his First Amendment rights, the plaintiff has asserted that his 
“tattoo of Celtic tribal design is an expression of his heritage and a statement of 
his ethnicity.”124 He also contended that his other tattoos are protected forms of 
“artistic expression.”125 The court found that tattoos, in general, are not protected 
speech under the First Amendment.126 Even if tattoos could be classified as 
protected speech, the court stated that, as a public employee, his speech must 
address a matter of “legitimate public concern” to receive First Amendment 
protection.127 Using the language of preference, the court concluded that his 
tattoos were merely “a way for him to express his personal views and beliefs 
and are not speech addressing a ‘legitimate public concern,’ as might be the case 
if the tattoos were to state, for example, some political message.”128 Therefore, 
the court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that he had been 
 
 115. Id. at 574. At that time, his superiors told him “that he had done nothing wrong.” Id. 
 116. Id. at 575. 
 117. Id. at 575. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. Along with his other claims, the plaintiff indicated that the chief had sought to retaliate 
against him through the bans on his tattoos because of the towing of the mayor’s car. Id. at 580. 
 121. Id. at 579. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 579. 
 124. Id. at 581. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 580–81. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 581. 
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unlawfully discriminated against “because of the massive number of tattoos on 
his body.”129 
Unwritten rules about covering tattoos became operative to punish a bike 
officer who upset a powerful politician, and a nose ring became problematic 
because of the employee’s intermittent public contact. In both cases, the 
employees were adequately performing their job responsibilities. Despite these 
employees’ proper job performance, the employers blocked their respective 
forms of body modification, denigrating their piercings and tattoos as 
“inappropriate” and lacking in “professionalism,” based on dominant group 
views of appearance. In each case, the courts largely dismissed the employee 
concerns under the rhetoric of preference, used in other cases involving ethnic 
and racial performative acts that conflict with dominant group grooming and 
dress codes.130 
Legal commentators have long criticized restrictive judicial interpretations 
that consider race and national origin only through the lens of claimed 
biological or immutable traits, such as racial or ethnic morphology and 
geography.131 Past court reliance on “natural” morphology or visible physical 
features to determine race or ethnicity is both confusing and inaccurate as to 
one’s race and ethnicity,132 while geography is under inclusive in protecting 
ethnicity.133 Legal analysts contest the emphasis on purported natural or 
immutable traits for race and national origin, asserting that these classifications 
need to be considered in the broader context of social constructions.134 
Prof. Camille Gear Rich contends that racial and ethnic identity “can only 
be claimed through speech, acts and behaviors—’performative acts,’” because 
“physicality is not entirely determinative” of race and ethnicity.135 Prof. Rich and 
other legal theorists call upon courts to protect racial and ethnic performative 
acts, such as hairstyles, dialect, language, and accent, to help prevent employers 
 
 129. Id. at 583. 
 130. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 131. Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 328; Klare, supra note 18, at 1412–14; Rich, supra note 18, at 1136–
43. 
 132. Franke, supra note 5, at 26–29; Rich, supra note 18, at 1176–78. Prof. Rich noted that race and 
ethnic morphological markers are not “objective” and “unchanging,” and that through life 
experience one comes to recognize the limits and inconsistencies of morphology. Further, an 
individual will see that other ethnic and racial groups share similar traits. Collectively, these 
experiences counsel that there are no definitive morphological markers for a particular race or 
ethnicity. Rich, supra note 18, at 1146–47. Prof. Rich reviews cases in which courts struggled to apply 
the morphological marker of white skin to determine race; finding a Chinese man white in one case 
and a Syrian man non-white in another. In another case, the light skin of multiracial slave was 
viewed as insufficient to find white identity when coupled with “a flat nose and woolly head of 
hair.” Id. at 1152–54. Similarly, Prof. Franke considers cases in which a Chinese female was 
considered “colored” and Mexican males were declared white, as showing the inadequacy of 
morphological markers and the view that race is a natural, rather than a political, category. Franke, 
supra note 5, at 27–28. 
 133. Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 329. 
 134. Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 329; Franke, supra note 5, at 28–29; Rich, supra note 18, at 1176–
78. 
 135. Rich, supra note 18, at 1176–78. 
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from discriminating by proxy.136 The performative approach to race and national 
origin has been criticized because of the difficulties in determining group-
identifying traits,137 as well as the potential dangers of judicial determination and 
protection of socially-coded racial and ethnic behavior which can both establish 
and reinforce stereotypical views of race and ethnicity.138 
Furthermore, cases on racial and ethnic performance in the workplace 
indicate that allowing employees to express their racial or ethnic identities is 
viewed as some kind of preference under Title VII, and thus rejected 
discrimination claims based on identity performance as attempts to improperly 
grant “substantive privileges” to protected classes.139 This approach flips the 
plaintiffs’ desires to express their racial or ethnic backgrounds into a demand for 
preferential treatment. This perspective fails to recognize that (1) employer dress 
and grooming codes are already privileging dominant white groups,140 and (2) 
racial and ethnic minorities are only seeking the equal opportunity to express 
their own views on acceptable appearance.141 Without examining the social 
constructs that inform the grooming policies, the courts thus allow an 
employer’s claimed neutral application of their code to provide legal cover for 
discrimination against minority groups and those who participate in “out 
group” behaviors in the workplace.142 
The individual employee’s desire to perform her racial or ethnic identity is 
therefore reducible to a mere personal preference rather than being properly 
understood as part of broader “cultural contests” in our society.143 Therefore, 
 
 136. Engle, supra note 18, at 329–33, 353; Rich, supra note 18, at 1192–96. See Yuracko, supra note 
18, at 61–64 (discussing various theorists who support the notion that performative racial and ethnic 
acts would be protected under Title VII). 
 137. Rich, supra note 18, at 1167; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 71. 
 138. Rich, supra note 18, at 1167, 1238–29; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 72–73. 
 139. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding English-only rule 
against claims of national-origin discrimination, as Title VII does not grant substantive privileges to 
express ethnic identity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (relying on Gloor, the court upheld English-only rule despite employee claims that the rule 
barred the performance of their cultural heritage and reinforced a workplace environment “of 
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation”). See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 140. See infra notes 293–300, 341–44 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Rich supra note 18, at 1181–82. Prof. Rich states that racial and ethnic performance of 
identity provides people “with a sense of agency. There is no ‘self’ before one attempts to assert 
one’s existence seizing the identity categories offered by language.” Id. at 1181. See infra notes 153, 
305 and accompanying text. 
 142. Engle, supra note 18, at 329–30; Rich, supra note 18, at 1194–96; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 63. 
Courts, grounded in their own racial and ethnic biases, often fail to recognize that these “neutral” 
employer grooming codes are products of dominant white culture. Engle, supra note 18, at 339. 
Based on inaccurate assumptions about “cultural universality and neutrality,” Prof. Engle contends 
that “American institutions reflect dominant racial and ethnic characteristics, with the consequence 
that race reform has proceeded on the basis of integration into ‘white’ cultural practices—practices 
that many whites mistake as racially neutral.” Unfortunately, she indicates that even organizations 
that strive for greater neutrality end up producing “only bland institutional forms whose antiseptic 
attempts at universalism have ensured the alienation of anyone with any cultural identity at all.” 
Engle, supra note 18, at 339. See infra notes 293–310, 341–44 and accompanying text. 
 143. Rich, supra note 18, at 1225. In racial and ethnic performance cases, Prof. Rich states that 
courts have diminished these disputes into “individual squabbles between employer and employee 
instead of symbolic cultural contests.” By concentrating on the individual’s claims, the courts fail to 
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employees who seek to exhibit their racial or cultural affinities are left 
unprotected, their choices diminished as unimportant preferences. Even though 
the employee is successfully performing her job, she can be discharged for 
attempting to perform her racial or ethnic identity, often in workplace 
environments that outwardly extol the virtues of diversity.144 
B. Limited Accommodation of Religious Performance in Body Art Work Rules 
Cases 
Religious discrimination is the only area where Title VII explicitly 
recognizes an individual’s need to perform her identity. The language of Title 
VII requires employers to make a reasonable accommodation for religious garb 
and appearance in the workplace,145 illustrating that dress and grooming codes 
need not be impenetrable employer prerogatives. In theory, the broad language 
of this accommodation requirement allows for greater religious performance in 
the workplace, but in practice, courts have deliberately blunted the statutory 
limitation as to “undue hardship” for the employer.146 The Supreme Court has 
severely limited the religious accommodation provision by holding that nothing 
more than a “de minimis” cost to the employer is required to trigger the undue 
hardship exception.147 The Supreme Court subsequently further eased demands 
on employers as to reasonable accommodation,148 finding that employers could 
choose any reasonable accommodation without having to select the employee’s 
requested accommodation, even if the employee’s proposal did not create an 
undue hardship.149 While religious accommodation cases undermine the judicial 
 
recognize the broader “repercussions for entire classes of workers, resulting in decreased 
opportunities for those who find it hard to abandon these behaviors and exacting a high dignitary 
cost on those who are compelled to give them up.” Id. 
 144. Prof. Rich contends that employers do not like employee displays of ethic or racial identities 
because they view such traits as associated with low status groups, raising fears about the potential 
for outward minority displays to challenge or disrupt the dominant group’s hegemony in the 
workplace. Rich, supra note 18, at 1141–42, 1160–61. See McGlothin v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. 
Dist., 829 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (dismissing racial-discrimination claim based on school 
policy banning a teacher’s aide from wearing Rastafarian dreadlocks and African head wraps, 
despite school’s adoption of diversity policies and programs in wake of Black History month). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). Under the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the “term ‘religion’ 
includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.” Id. See Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 357–62 (discussing tensions between anti-
discrimination law’s emphasis on neutrality and Title VII language requiring reasonable 
accommodation or preferences for religious practices and observances). See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 147. Trans-World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
 148. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). See Engle, supra note 18, at 391–92; 
Susannah P. Mroz, NOTE: True Believers?: Problems of Definition in Title VII Religious Discrimination 
Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 145, 149–50 (offering a superb review of the struggle to define religion 
in relation to Title VII employment discrimination claims). 
 149. 479 U.S. at 68–69. The Court indicated that the employer’s offer of unpaid leave for religious 
observances was a reasonable accommodation, even though this accommodation had been tried and 
then rejected by the plaintiff as unsatisfactory. Id. at 64–65, 70. 
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assumption that employers cannot provide reasonable opportunities for 
performative dress and grooming in the workplace, the courts have thwarted 
these efforts through their narrow interpretations of these Title VII provisions. 
Because the courts perceive religion to be a voluntary choice, courts have 
struggled with whether to view the religious accommodation requirement as 
protecting immutable characteristics versus safeguarding mutable or voluntary 
choices.150 To bridge this divide, courts often view the established requirements 
of a religious practice as similar to immutable characteristics, while an 
individual’s interpretations of her religious duties are viewed as volitional 
choices or personal preferences not worthy of protection.151 Despite Title VII’s 
language, and in light of the fundamental First Amendment rights at issue, 
employees still find themselves regularly challenging employer dress and 
grooming codes in hopes of obtaining reasonable accommodations,152 especially 
when minority religions are involved.153 Employees often lose these cases under 
 
 150. Engle, supra note 18, at 343. See generally id. (providing an excellent analysis of development 
of religious discrimination in employment and the often contradictory judicial review of such 
claims); Mroz, supra note 148 (providing a superb review of struggle to define religion in relation to 
Title VII employment discrimination claims). 
 151. See Engle, supra note 18, at 323, 357–62, 373 (discussing tensions between anti-discrimination 
law’s emphasis on neutrality and Title VII language requiring reasonable accommodation or 
preferences for religious practices and observances). 
In discussing the split in courts over religious mandates versus personal preference, Prof. Engle 
stated: 
In particular, the courts that . . . deployed the institutional religion-personal preference 
distinction to refuse to protect belief and observance that was not decreed by the church 
(compelled) but was seen as merely a matter of personal preference (volitional). Thus, the 
institutional religion requirement functioned in the same way as the immutability 
requirement in the race, national origin, and sex cases: it defined what courts considered 
volitional out of the protected category. . . . [T]he courts assume that, once one becomes a 
member of an organized religion, conduct is dictated by the church. To the extent that the 
claimed religious conduct is seen to represent only a preference, it is not beyond the 
individual’s control, and is therefore not protected by the statute. 
Engle, supra note 18, at 373–74. 
 152. See, e.g., Flowers v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 397 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that allowing 
Rastafarian to wear a khofi religious head wrap over dreadlocks did not create undue hardship for 
college); Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding religion discrimination where 
employer refused reasonable accommodation for correctional officer’s Rastafarian dreadlocks 
despite other religious exemptions for Jewish and Sikh employees); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 
F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining that offering Muslim employee with beard another similar 
position without public contact was not reasonable accommodation); EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet 
Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug 29, 2005) (finding that 
employer had failed to provide sufficient evidence of undue hardship in accommodating employee’s 
religious tattoos); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000) (finding that public employer had 
failed to use least restrictive means when it failed to permit Native American correctional officer to 
pin up hair rather than cut it); DeVeaux v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. D. & C.4th 315 (2005) (granting 
preliminary injunction finding that city had failed to show no-beard policy for firefighters enforced 
against Muslim increased job safety), available at 2005 WL 1869666, at *1. 
 153. Klare, supra note 18, at 1404–12 (discussing how appearance law favors mainstream white 
Christianity over minority religions with distinct and visible dress or grooming practices); Mroz, 
supra note 148, at 172 (discussing view that courts struggle with proper recognition of “less 
traditional belief systems”). See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 521 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Justice Marshall stated: 
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the undue hardship exception when faced with their employers’ claims that the 
accommodation compromises workplace safety,154 disrupts workplace 
homogeny,155 or harms the company’s professional image,156 or that the 
accommodation would merely serve the employee’s preference in observing her 
religious beliefs.157 Regardless of the accommodationist language of Title VII, 
courts sometimes find undue hardship solely on the basis that requiring any 
exemption to the dress and grooming codes would not be neutral and might 
provide an unfair preference to employees seeking accommodations.158 It is clear 
that despite the accommodationist provisions of Title VII, employers are quite 
resistant to religious performance as to dress and grooming, and not just racial 
and ethnic performative acts in the workplace.159 
Two recent and similar cases on body modification rules in employment re-
emphasize the confusion among judges as to whether or not to protect religious 
performative acts. Both cases concern employees who were once again properly 
 
I am also perplexed by the related notion that for purposes of constitutional analysis 
religious faiths may be divided into two categories—those with visible dress and 
grooming requirements and those without. . . . The practical effect of this categorization is 
that, under the guise of neutrality and evenhandedness, majority religions are favored 
over distinctive minority faiths. This dual category analysis is fundamentally flawed . . . . 
Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming summary 
judgment for employer who required Sikh employee to be clean-shaven to insure gas-tight face seal 
for respirator for protection against potential exposure to toxic gases); EEOC v. Heil-Quaker Corp., 
No. 1-88-0439, 1990 WL 58543, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 1990) (holding that a Muslim woman’s long 
skirt was a safety hazard in manufacturing environment). 
 155. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 521 (upholding Air Force grooming policy against request by 
Orthodox Jew to wear yarmulke indoors as disruptive of military discipline); Wilson v. U.S. West 
Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that an employee’s graphic anti-abortion button 
worn as vow to her religious beliefs was a form of religious harassment of co-workers). 
 156. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco, 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (determining that exemption from 
grooming code for religious facial piercing would place undue hardship on employer by harming 
professional image), aff’g on other grounds 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2004); EEOC v. Sambo’s of 
Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that exempting Sikh job applicant from 
restaurant’s no-facial-hair policy would constitute undue hardship on company’s image). 
 157. Cloutier, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (determining that visible eyebrow piercing was unprotected 
preference, not religiously mandated), aff’d on other grounds, 390 F.3d at 126; Wilson, 58 F.3d at 138 
(finding that an employee’s wearing of graphic anti-abortion pin was personal preference, not 
religiously mandated). 
 158. Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(indicating in dicta that requested accommodation for religious head wrap would disrupt religious 
neutrality and raised establishment clause concerns); United States v. Bd. of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. 
of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding undue hardship in requested exemption from school 
dress-code for Muslim teacher; stressing importance of religious neutrality in applying ban on 
religious dress); Sambo’s, 530 F. Supp. at 92 (finding that requested exemption would amount to 
religious preference). 
 159. Many employers are struggling with the evolving demands for increased respect of 
religious diversity in the workplace. See DelPo, supra note 22, at 345–47; Richard T. Foltin & James D. 
Standish, Your Job or Your Faith? Under the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, Americans would not have 
to choose, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 36; Sue Reisinger, Getting Religion, CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2005, 
at 74. See also Art Lambert, God Goes to Work, WORKFORCE WEEK, June, 2005 (provides questions-and-
answers on dealing with divisive religious issues in the workplace), available at 
www.workforce.com/archive/article/24/09/55.php. 
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performing their job tasks, but were discharged for refusing to comply with an 
employer’s grooming and dress code. Not unlike other cultures discussed in 
Part I, both employees viewed their body modification as reflective of their 
religious or spiritual beliefs. 
In Cloutier v. Costco,160 Kimberly Cloutier, an employee with four years of 
service, challenged Costco’s revised grooming code that prohibited facial 
piercings as religious discrimination against the Church of Body Modification 
(CBM).161 Since 1998, Cloutier, a cashier and front-end assistant, had worn an 
eyebrow piercing to work and over time engaged in more piercing, tattooing, 
cutting, and scarification.162 She believed these practices held spiritual meaning 
for her. In June 2001, Cloutier joined the CBM and interpreted their beliefs as 
consistently mandating the display of one’s piercings.163 
Under a revised policy in March 2001, Costco prohibited any “visible facial 
or tongue jewelry,” allowing only earrings.164 The company indicated that it had 
instituted the neutral dress code in order to present a professional image to its 
customer base.165 At the time of the revised code, Cloutier wore eleven visible ear 
piercings, four hidden tattoos, and one eyebrow piercing.166 In June 2001, Costco 
began to enforce the policy and Cloutier was sent home on several occasions for 
refusing to remove her eyebrow piercing.167 Ultimately, Cloutier filed an EEOC 
complaint, and missed work shifts on her manager’s orders until Costco could 
address her claim.168 Finally, Costco fired her for violating their grooming code, 
asserting that the CBM was not a real religion, and that her absences were 
therefore unexcused since they were due to her violation of the company’s 
grooming code.169 
In the subsequent EEOC conciliation, Costco offered to let her return if she 
covered her eyebrow piercing with a bandage or inserted a clear plastic retainer 
instead of her eyebrow ring. Cloutier rejected these demands and brought an 
action in federal court.170 Granting summary judgment to Costco, the District 
Court found that the company had offered reasonable accommodations to 
Cloutier regarding the plastic retainer or bandage. In addition, drawing from 
earlier rhetoric on religious preference rather than mandated tenets, the court 
determined that the CBM did not require the full-time display of her piercing, 
but that Cloutier merely preferred such a display.171 
 
 160. 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 390 F. 3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 161. See Church of Body Modification, http://www.uscobm.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
 162. Cloutier, 311 F. Supp. at 192. 
 163. Id. at 193. 
 164. Id. at 193 n.8. 
 165. Id. at 193. 
 166. Id. at 192–93. 
 167. Id. at 193. 
 168. Id. at 193–94. 
 169. Id. at 194. 
 170. Id. at 195. Cloutier brought her federal action for religious discrimination under Title VII. Id. 
at 195–200. She also brought a state claim under Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination law, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1A) (1997). Cloutier, 311 F. Supp. at 200–02. 
 171. Cloutier, 311 F. Supp. at 199. See supra notes 102, 143–44 and accompanying text. 
11__PONTE_GILLAN.DOC 2/8/2007 2:07 PM 
 BODY ART WORK RULES 343 
After losing in District Court, Cloutier appealed,172 with the First Circuit 
refocusing the analysis on whether or not Cloutier’s demand for an exemption 
from the new policy caused an undue hardship on Costco.173 Cloutier contended 
that she had been successfully performing her job, and that no customers or co-
workers had ever complained about her facial piercing.174 She argued that any 
claimed hardship on Costco would be purely hypothetical.175 The opinion also 
noted that the EEOC had found that Cloutier’s actions were religiously based 
and that Costco had failed to show that allowing her facial jewelry presented 
undue hardship.176 
Conversely, the appeals court determined that personal appearance was 
essential to Costco’s image, particularly for employees, like Cloutier, who had 
regular customer contact.177 The decision stated that employers had the 
discretion to institute codes “to promote a professional public image” or “to 
appeal to customer preference.”178 The court indicated the following: 
It is axiomatic that, for better or for worse, employees reflect on their employers. 
This is particularly true of employees who regularly interact with customers, as 
Cloutier did in her cashier position. Even if Cloutier did not personally receive 
any complaints about her appearance, her facial jewelry influenced Costco’s 
public image and, in Costco’s calculation, detracted from its professionalism.179 
The court did not probe for illegal stereotypes that might underlie the new 
code,180 nor did it distance its judicial reasoning from suspect employer claims 
based on illegal discrimination grounded in customer preference,181 but instead 
merely accepted at face value Costco’s contention that her piercings detracted 
from the company’s professional image. The court concluded that exempting 
Cloutier from the policy would cause an undue hardship, affirming the grant of 
summary judgment.182 
 
 172. Cloutier v. Costco, 390 F.3d 126, 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 173. Id. at 134–37. 
 174. Id. at 135. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 130. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 135–36. But see supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 179. Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 135. 
 180. See supra notes 51, 97, 100, 219–231 and accompanying text. 
 181. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Questions and Answers About the 
Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs Under the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Laws (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/backlash-employee.html (last visited Oct. 23, 
2006) (stating that employer reliance on customer preference or uncomfortable customer or co-
worker feelings on religious attire is illegal discrimination under Title VII); U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n, Questions and Answers About Employer Responsibilities Concerning the 
Employment of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs (2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/back 
lash-employee.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) (explicitly holds that customer preference on religious 
dress attire not acceptable workplace justification, requiring potential exemptions from dress and 
grooming codes). See supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra notes 272–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 182. Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 136. 
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Soon after Cloutier, another federal court took a different view on visible 
religious tattoos in EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.183 In Red Robin, the 
employer’s new grooming policy demanded that a six-month employee, 
Edward Rangel, cover up small tattoos surrounding his wrists.184 Rangel, who 
practiced Kemetecism,185 received the wrist tattoos as part of a Kemetic religious 
ceremony.186 The tattoos were Coptic prayers which Rangel believed he could 
not intentionally hide without committing a sin under Kemetecism.187 The only 
time his religion would allow him to purposefully cover the tattoos was during 
the religious month of Mesura when Ra was believed to die and then be 
reborn.188 
Before the revised code came into force, Rangel had informed his 
supervisor about his religious beliefs and had worked with visible tattoos for 
about six months.189 At a subsequent orientation for a new restaurant, higher-
level managers demanded that Rangel cover his tattoos or face discharge.190 
When he explained their religious significance, these same managers 
recommended that he cover them with bracelets or wrist bands, contrary to the 
chain’s own jewelry policy.191 When Rangel refused to cover them, he was 
escorted out of the building, and when he returned for his next shift, he was 
again ejected for not covering his tattoos.192 Unlike Costco, Red Robin refused to 
offer any alternatives, claiming that Rangel’s religious beliefs were merely 
personal preferences that the company need not accommodate.193 Eventually, 
Red Robin fired Rangel for violating its company’s personal appearance 
policy.194 
Similar to Costco, the court considered whether an exemption from the 
personal appearance code would cause an undue hardship on the restaurant 
chain.195 At trial, unlike Costco, Red Robin actually did supply a company profile 
and a customer survey that indicated that the restaurant chain was viewed as 
both family- and child-friendly, and that Red Robin considered Rangel’s tattoos 
as inconsistent with that image.196 
Noting the First Circuit’s decision in Cloutier, the District Court refused to 
follow its approach, instead choosing to follow the Ninth Circuit’s precedent on 
undue hardship. The court stated that undue hardship must be proven by 
 
 183. No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005). 
 184. Id. at *3. The only time his religion would allow him to purposefully cover the tattoos was 
during the religious month of Mesura when Ra was believed to die and then be reborn. Id. 
 185. Kemeticism dates back to ancient Egypt and focuses on communal prayer, meditation and 
ritual ceremonies showing “servitude to Ra, the Egyptian god of the sun.” Id. at *2. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *2–3. 
 189. Id. at *3. 
 190. Id. at *3–4. 
 191. Id. at *4. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at *10, *14. 
 194. Id. at *3–4. 
 195. Id. *14–20. 
 196. Id. at *18. 
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showing an “actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work 
routine.”197 In this fact situation, the court asserted that no customers had ever 
complained about Rangel’s tattoos and doubted that many had even noticed the 
tiny inscriptions.198 Despite the provision of the study and survey, the district 
court indicated that the company had failed to offer any evidence that Rangel’s 
visible Coptic tattoos were incongruous with a family- or child-oriented 
environment, or that Red Robin customers held negative feelings about these 
religious tattoos.199 
Furthermore, the court expressly rejected that allowing a religious 
exemption for Rangel would open up a “slippery slope” which would force the 
company “to allow whatever tattoos, facial piercings or other displays of 
religious information an employee might claim, no matter how outlandish.”200 
The court concluded that potential concerns that others might rightfully seek 
similar religious accommodations would not support a finding of undue 
hardship under Title VII.201 
Unlike the First Circuit, the Red Robin court went beyond accepting the 
employer’s justifications at face value. The court was willing to require that the 
employer actually connect its perceived concerns with real hardships rather than 
abstract harms. Indeed, the District Court clearly wanted the employer to make 
a connection between its code and actual job performance, as signaled by its 
analysis of undue hardship through the lens of real third party co-worker 
impositions or workplace disruptions. 
While the courts sometimes protect some religious performance in the 
workplace via body art, these opportunities are still rigidly limited despite the 
broad accommodationist language of Title VII. The constant resistance of 
employers and courts to accommodate religiously-motivated performative 
conduct has catalyzed both mainstream and minority religions to work together 
to advocate for passage of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 
(WRFA), which would expand the protections for religious expressions in the 
workplace, including in areas of grooming and dress.202 The proposed WRFA 
expands the gamut of approaches to reasonable accommodation and requires a 
 
 197. Id. at *17. 
 198. Id. at *18. 
 199. Id. at *18–19. 
 200. Id. at *19. 
 201. Id. *19–20. See also Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing 
district court finding that hypothetical concerns about innumerable employee requests and potential 
morale problems are not sufficient for finding of undue hardship). 
 202. The companion bills are S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.00677: (last visited Dec. 14, 2006), and H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005), available 
at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.01445: (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). The 
WRFA has received broad political and religious support from a diverse range of conservative and 
liberal groups. Foltin & Standish, supra note 153, at 36. See James A. Sonne, Article: The Perils of 
Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 
147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2004) (discussing widespread support for 
previous efforts to pass prior proposal for WRFA). For examination and criticisms of earlier versions 
of the proposed WRFA, see generally id. at 1051–80; Baxter, supra note 22, at nn.124–223; Robert A. 
Caplen, Note: A Struggle of Biblical Proportions: The Campaign to Enact The Workplace Religious Freedom 
Act of 2003, 16 U. FLA. J. LAW. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 611–23 (2005). 
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showing of actual undue hardship, grounding the relevant inquiry in terms of 
job-related safety, the imposition of unfair burdens on co-workers, or 
disruptions in the workplace environment. These rationales could easily be 
extended to protect the identity-performative acts of other protected classes as 
well. 
C. Gender Performance and Body Art Work Rules 
In handling gender discrimination cases, courts have traditionally focused 
on sex rather than gender, looking almost exclusively at claimed biological or 
immutable differences.203 Judicial inquiry has been largely limited to delineating 
and naturalizing sex differences as products of biology,204 similar to the cases of 
race and ethnicity described above in Part II. Commentators assert that the 
judicial emphasis on sex as a natural difference serves largely to reaffirm 
dominant power groups and to continue subordination of other lower status 
groups in the social and workplace hierarchy.205 Gender theorists have criticized 
this limited biological inquiry, arguing that gender must be viewed as a social 
construction rather than a biological classification.206 Gender as a social construct 
moves beyond biology to consider social rules and cultural codes that impact 
individual human agency,207 creating the conditions for gender discrimination. 
Such an approach provides opportunities for broader legal protections for 
individuals who do not conform to traditional gender roles and expectations.208 
 
 203. Engle, supra note 18, at 341–42; Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include 
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 395–
96, 401 (2001); Franke, supra note 5, at 1–2; Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity 
in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 85–86 (2002). 
 204. Flynn, supra note 203, at 394; Franke, supra note 5, at 2–4; Klare, supra note 18, at 1395, 1397; 
Vojdik, supra note 203, at 85–86. 
 205. Nicole Anzuoni, Gender Non-Conformists under Title VI: A Confusing Jurisprudence in Need of a 
Legislative Remedy, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 871, 875–76 (2002); Engle, supra note 18, at 339, 353; FRANKE, 
supra note 5, at 3–4, 8–9. See Arthur Brittan, Masculinities and Masculinism, in THE MASCULINITIES 
READER 54–55 (Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank J. Barrett eds., 2001) (criticizing masculinism as an 
ideology that seeks to justify and naturalize male dominance and power). 
 206. Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in the Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory, in PERFORMING FEMINISMS: FEMINIST CRITICAL THEORY AND THEATRE 271, 273, 274 
(Sue-Ellen Case ed., 1990); David Collinson & Jeff Hearn, Naming Men as Men: Implications for Work, 
Organization and Management, in THE MASCULINITIES READER 146–47 (Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank 
J. Barrett eds., 2001); Franke, supra note 5, at 2–3; Klare, supra note 18, at 1397; Ann C. McGinley, 
Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 369–70 (2004). 
 207. Franke, supra note 5, at 1–2, 3–4; Butler, supra note 206, at 278–79; Collinson & Hearn, supra 
note 206, at 146–47; Klare, supra note 18, at 1436–37. Prof. Katherine Franke contends that the 
“disaggregation of sex from gender represents a central mistake of equality jurisprudence.” She adds 
that every anti-discrimination claim based on “sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown to 
be grounded in normative gender rules and roles.” Franke, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 208. Flynn, supra note 203, at 395; Franke, supra note 5, at 8–9; Klare, supra note 18, at 1436–37; 
Vojdik, supra note 203, at 86–87. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (finding 
illegal sex discrimination where a female was denied partnership because she failed to conform to 
gender expectations about behavior and dress); see also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender 
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 
1, 2–4 (1995) (stating that protection against gender expectations under Price Waterhouse should 
extend beyond masculine female to effeminate male). See infra Part III. 
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Numerous social scientists have long asserted that our culture’s agreed 
upon codes of masculinity and femininity teach us how perform gender roles.209 
In her groundbreaking book Gender Trouble, philosopher Judith Butler first spells 
out her influential claim that gender is performative, meaning although people 
are born with specific sex organs, they still must learn how to act feminine or 
masculine.210 In other words, one is not born with gender, but becomes gendered 
“through a stylized repetition of acts,”211 which “are renewed, revised, and 
consolidated through time.”212 Prof. Butler argues that, gender is not determined 
by physiology but is instead a social construction that is open to contestation.213 
Philosopher Sandra Lee Bartky formulates this concept more succinctly: “We are 
born male or female, but not masculine and feminine. Femininity is an artifice, 
an achievement.”214 Gender is socially constructed and performed, not 
biologically determined, feminist film theorist Teresa de Lauretis asserts: 
“Gender is not a property of bodies or something originally existent in human 
beings.”215 As body studies theorist Susan Bordo notes, “in our present culture, 
our activities are coded as ‘male’ or ‘female’ and will function as such within the 
prevailing system of gender-power relations.”216 
In considering anti-discrimination law, Prof. Franke supports the 
contention that individuals must be allowed to decide their gender, free from 
strict biological notions of sex.217 She asserts that this approach will more fully 
 
 209. But see Brittan, supra note 205, at 51 (asserting that concepts of masculinity and femininity 
are constantly subject to reinterpretation); Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, in THE 
MASCULINITIES READER 266–67 (Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank J. Barrett eds., 2001) (arguing that 
notions of masculinity and manhood are constantly in a state of change); Vjodik, supra note 203, at 92 
(claiming that the process of domination is more important than any specific sociological or 
historical notions of masculinity or femininity). 
 210. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 6, 22, 139–41 
(1990); see Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects and International Law, 15 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 281, 282–83 (2002) (discussing Butler on gender as repetition of performative acts). 
 211. Butler, supra note 206, at 271. See BUTLER, supra note 210, at 140. 
 212. Butler, supra note 206, at 274. See BUTLER, supra note 210, at 141. 
 213. Butler, supra note 206, at 273. See BUTLER, supra note 210, at 31, 138–39. As Butler explains, 
[b]ecause there is neither an “essence” that gender expresses or externalizes nor an 
objective ideal to which gender aspires; because gender is not a fact, the various acts of 
gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender at all. 
Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis . . . . The authors of 
gender become entranced by their own fictions whereby the construction compels one’s 
belief in its necessity and naturalness. 
Butler, supra note 206, at 273; see BUTLER, supra note 210 at 33, 31, 144–45. But see Vojdik, supra note 
203, at 68, 89–90 (arguing that gender is a social process, and criticizing Butler’s view of gender 
performance as susceptible to individual will in changing identities, which therefore underestimates 
the difficulty in subverting prevalent gender codes). 
 214. SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
OPPRESSION 65 (Routledge 1990). 
 215. THERESA DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF GENDER: ESSAYS ON THEORY, FILM, AND FICTION 3 
(1987). 
 216. Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERISM 
152 (L. Nicholson ed., 1990) (emphasis in original). 
 217. Franke, supra note 5, at 8–9. See Flynn, supra note 203, at 395–96 (contending that “self-
identification is the central component of sex”); see also Brittan, supra note 205, at 53 (arguing against 
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and fairly protect a broader range of individuals from illegal gender 
discrimination in the workplace,218 stating that 
equality jurisprudence must abandon its reliance upon a biological definition of 
sexual identity and sex discrimination and instead should adopt a more 
behavioral or performative conception of sex. The wrong of sex discrimination 
must be understood to include all gender role stereotypes whether imposed 
upon men, women, or both men and women in a particular workplace. . . . 
[S]exual equality jurisprudence should include a commitment to a fundamental 
right to determine one’s gender independent of one’s biological sex. Such a 
fundamental right should exist both for the transgendered person who seeks a 
harassment-free workplace or the benefits of heterosexual marriage and for the 
male senior associate in a law firm who wants neither to be ridiculed by his 
male colleagues nor penalized when he comes up for partner because he 
requests time off from work to care for his newborn child.219 
Based on judicial treatment of racial and ethnic performance, one would 
think that courts would also oppose the gendered performance of dress and 
grooming codes. There are no biological or immutable traits that require women 
and men to dress or groom certain ways. Therefore, under the judicial analysis 
of race and ethnicity, women and men should not be required to perform gender 
roles through grooming and dress. In Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan 
optimistically stated that the case’s interpretation of Title VII would see the end 
of gender stereotyping in the workplace for both sexes.220 It was initially thought 
that Price Waterhouse might lead to the defeat of gendered dress and grooming 
codes as “sex-plus” discrimination based on unlawful stereotypes about men 
and women, but most courts have refused to extend the case outside of the 
sexual harassment context.221 Women therefore find that the law continues to 
 
the view in masculine ideology that sees gender as non-negotiable). See infra notes 325–28 and 
accompanying text. 
 218. Franke, supra note 5, at 8–9. See also Case, supra note 208 (asserting that a more expansive 
view of anti-discrimination law should include protection of men and women who display both 
masculine and feminine characteristics); Flynn, supra note 203 (seeking greater protection of trans-
gendered individuals through a broader view of sexual identity as a choice). 
 219. Franke, supra note 5, at 8–9. But see generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–21, 37–38 (2000) (contending that anti-
discrimination law cannot be sex-blind nor seek the obliteration of gender conventions, but instead 
should work to reshape and reformulate social practices); Yuracko, supra note 18, at 72–73 (arguing 
in favor of some gender-specific norms; calling for trait-plus sex discrimination to be illegal only if it 
reinforces a power/status hierarchy in the workplace). 
 220. 490 U.S. at 251. Justice Brennan wrote the following: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 
 221. Yuracko, supra note 18, at 23–28. In one case before Price Waterhouse, a court struck down a 
rule imposing gendered dress and grooming requirements on female workers as containing 
demeaning gender stereotypes. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 
1033–34 (7th Cir. 1979) (court struck down uniform rule imposed only on female employees as 
perpetuating demeaning stereotypes about female fashion competition and status in workplace). See 
infra notes 266–90 and accompanying text. 
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allow employers to mark them through grooming codes that either exploit or 
repress female sexuality,222 and men find that they must conform to dominant 
societal views of masculinity in these same codes.223 
While courts routinely reject racial and ethnic performative acts and 
severely limit religious performative acts, courts take exactly the opposite 
approach when considering gender-based dress and grooming codes, often 
demanding that employees properly perform their genders.224 While critics of 
race and ethnic performative acts worry about creating improper racial and 
ethnic stereotypes, courts seem largely untroubled about reaffirming and 
reinforcing harmful gender stereotypes which they see as natural.225 Yet the 
courts have not properly articulated any test for deciding which gender 
stereotypes are demeaning and which are not, taking more of an ad hoc “I know 
it when I see it” approach.226 
Courts typically try to justify differential treatment under dress and 
grooming codes by claiming a reliance on community standards,227 the equal 
 
 222. Klare, supra note 18, at 143; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: 
Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 203 (2004). Through these codes, 
patriarchal standards of beauty and sexuality continue to be imprinted on women’s bodies as a 
means of social control. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 223. Prof. McGinley indicates: 
Masculinities research is a growing field that seeks to uncover a structure that reinforces 
the superiority of men over women and a series of practices associated with masculine 
behavior, performed by men and women, that aid men in maintaining their superior 
position over women. . . . [M]asculinities reinforce stereotypes of the proper role and 
behavior of women and men at work. Some of these practices include aggression, 
competitiveness, informal networking, and regarding women as sexual objects, caregivers, 
or “aggressive bitches.” 
McGinley, supra note 206, at 364–65 (citations omitted). See also Collinson & Hearn, supra note 206, at 
147 (defining masculinities as discourses and practices of men that are grounded in social constructs 
instead of biological differences). 
 224. Engle, supra note 18, at 340–41, 353; Vojdik, supra note 203, at 92. Highlighting the 
contradictory treatment of race and national origin versus gender grooming codes, Prof. Engle 
states: 
[C]ourts have found that it is legal for employers to rely on what they see as dominant 
societal rules about how men and women should dress. Although courts have long held 
that Title VII prohibits employers from relying on stereotypes about men and women, 
courts in these cases overtly and unapologetically have allowed them to do just that. While 
assertions of cultural identity go unprotected in the race cases, they are enforced and 
reinforced in the sex cases. 
Engle, supra note 18, at 340–41. 
 225. See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. Some legal commentators also seem 
unconcerned about gender-based grooming codes drawn from community standards. Rich, supra 
note 18, at 1229–30 (calling for respect of racial and ethnic performative acts in grooming codes, 
while viewing gendered grooming codes based on social norms as well within an employer’s 
discretion); Yuracko, supra note 18, at 39, 49, 52–53, 92, (viewing discrimination against men in 
feminine attire as legally justified, because such behavior would be socially perceived as deviant or 
strange). 
 226. See Hillary J. Bouchard, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.: Employer Appearance Standards 
And The Promotion Of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203, 213 (2006); Engle, supra note 18, at 353. 
See supra notes 225 and accompanying text. 
 227. Bouchard, supra note 226, at 221; Klare, supra note 18, at 1420–21; Serafina Raskin, Sex-Based 
Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against Gender Stereotyping, 17 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 249–50 (2006); Yuracko, supra note 18, at 52–53. 
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burdening of both genders,228 or some diminished form of the BFOQ, focusing 
on the whether or not the proscribed traits are immutable.229 Relying on 
community standards laden with gender stereotypes, courts have consistently 
allowed for differential treatment of females and males, broadly accepting the 
importance of men and women properly performing their assigned gender 
roles.230 Similar to race discrimination cases based on hairstyles, courts in gender 
cases often try to naturalize gender differentiation based on cultural or 
community codes.231 In cases dealing with gendered grooming codes, Prof. Engle 
indicates that courts have conflated immutability and culture, erroneously 
concluding the following: 
[T]here are actual differences between men and women, which are accurately 
represented by societal dress and grooming norms. Employers are not required 
to protect conduct outside those norms. Hence, courts in the sex cases deploy a 
natural-artificial distinction of a different type. Women and men dressing and 
 
 228. Engle, supra note 18, at 341; Megan Kelly, Making-Up Conditions Of Employment: The Unequal 
Burdens Test As A Flawed Mode Of Analysis In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE 
U.L. REV. 45, 50–51 (2006); William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. 
L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2006); Raskin, supra note 227, at 255. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 
392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that it did not violate the unequal burdens test to fire an 
employee who refused to wear make-up), aff’d, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); Frank v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that weight policy that applied different 
weight requirements on men and women of equal height and age failed unequal burdens test); 
Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that weight 
requirements for only female flight attendants created unequal burden). 
 229. In dealing with different hair length grooming policies for men and women, some courts 
have found that reasonable grooming requirements are necessary to the success of an employer’s 
business environment and that hair length is purely volitional. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t 
Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 
1996); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 
539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R.. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title 
Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 
F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); Jahns v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 761, 762 (D. Mo. 1975). In cases involving gendered 
dress codes, courts have similarly given employer’s broad discretion unless an immutable sex trait is 
in dispute. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating a 
company may require that only men wear ties in the workplace); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 
466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (upholding a policy that banned pantsuits on women 
because it did not implicate stereotypes or immutable traits). However, some courts do not use a 
typical BFOQ analysis, which examines whether or not the challenged policy relates to the successful 
performance of actual job tasks. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) 
(striking down company’s claimed BFOQ for fetal protection policy because gender classifications were 
not related to performance of actual job tasks). Under the narrow construction of that concept most of 
these codes would likely fail because they have little to do with actual job performance. 
 230. Cruz, supra note 89, at 246; Engle, supra note 18, at 342. As regards to gendered dress and 
grooming codes, Prof. Cruz asserts that the courts have failed to apply the full breadth and meaning 
of Title VII, but have resorted “to baroque and linguistically implausible interpretations of what it is 
to ‘discriminate’ . . . in an anxious, or perhaps near completely unreflective, effort to shield 
employers’ ‘prerogatives’ regarding differential treatment of men and women in the workplace.” 
Cruz, supra note 89, at 246. 
 231. See supra notes 204–206 and accompanying text. 
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grooming in accordance with societal norms is natural. Countering those norms 
is artificial.232 
Despite differential treatment under workplace policies, the courts try to claim 
neutrality by arguing that these dress codes are acceptable so long as they 
equally burden men and women.233 
A review of body art discrimination cases reveals that courts uphold the 
right of employers to equally ban women and men from displaying visible 
employee tattoos and piercings as part of an employer’s workplace prerogatives, 
as was the case with the prohibitions of nose rings in the Motion Picture and 
Sam’s Club cases.234 Courts also allow the introduction of evidence about body 
modification practices in sexual harassment cases,235 using negative sexual 
connotations about these practices to both support and undermine female claims 
of sexual harassment.236 However, when considering gendered body art work 
rules outside of the harassment context, the courts take mixed views on gender 
performative acts.237 
Returning to Riggs, the plaintiff also claimed gender discrimination in the 
police chief’s demand that he cover his tattoos.238 As part of his evidence, he 
offered an appendix that listed the sex of fifteen employees who were allowed to 
display their tattoos in the workplace.239 The court found that because the list of 
the officers with visible tattoos included both men and women the plaintiff 
failed to provide proof that he had been discriminated against based on his 
 
 232. Engle, supra note 18, at 342. With courts using a false dichotomy of immutable or natural 
(nonvolitional) versus mutable or artificial (volitional) conduct, Prof. Engle indicates that the courts 
believe that “[b]lacks wearing cornrows, bilingual Hispanics speaking Spanish, and men wearing 
earrings are behaving neither necessarily nor naturally. The only conduct that might be protected is 
that which the courts seem inclined to see as ‘natural’—blacks wearing afros, slips of the tongue by 
bilinguals, and women having school-age children.” Conversely, the courts liberally allow 
employers “to discriminate on ‘artificial’ characteristics—blacks or Hispanics acting in ways that 
they believe accord with their culture, or men acting like women.” Id. at 353. 
 233. See supra notes 228, 230–31 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 235. In several cases, female plaintiffs have supplied evidence about body modification to 
support their claims of sexual harassment. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 328 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (the plaintiff’s co-worker showed her a picture of a pierced scrotum, and this was evidence 
of an overall pattern of sexual harassment against the plaintiff); Lovelace v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 
1:97-cv-3267-JTC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17683, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 1999) (to support a 
workplace-sexual-harassment claim, the plaintiff said that her supervisor pulled down her shirt to 
see her tattoo); Albertson’s Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. 886 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.) (employee challenged 
enforcement of no-tongue-ring rule as sexual harassment, when manager required her to repeatedly 
stick out her tongue). 
 236. Alternatively, a female plaintiff’s piercing was used to undermine her sexual harassment 
claim. See Ferencich v. Merritt, No. 02-6222, 2003 WL 22430394, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2003) (by 
sticking out her pierced tongue, the plaintiff may have acted flirtatious and thereby welcomed 
sexual advances). See McGinley, supra note 206, at 395–96 (discussing how women lose out 
professionally due to stereotypical views of female co-workers as “dangerous sex symbol[s]”). See 
supra notes 21, 68 and accompanying text. 
 237. See infra notes 238–90 and accompanying text. 
 238. 229 F. Supp. 2d at 577, 579. 
 239. Id. at 579. 
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sex.240 Although tattoos are socially-encoded as male, the police chief permitted 
both sexes to show their tattoos, allowing women to tilt toward the masculine. 
The court concluded that making the plaintiff wear long-sleeved shirts and long 
pants was not gender discrimination because the employer allowed both men 
and women to show their tattoos in the workplace. 
The employer in Hub Folding Box Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination (MCAD)241 took the opposite view, trying to block a 
female from displaying a tattoo since the employer had socially-encoded the 
mark as appropriately masculine and, therefore, inappropriately feminine. In 
the employer’s eyes the woman with the tattoo was putting her sexual 
immorality on display because she was marking herself with a signifier of 
virility, a trait that is associated with sexual as well as physical power and 
aggression.242 A state appeals court examined the employer’s unwritten 
gendered workplace rules on visible tattoos under state anti-discrimination 
law.243 
Under the facts of the case, Deborah Connor, a clerk, was hired and 
properly performed her job duties for several months.244 In the summer months, 
she began to wear short-sleeved shirts and her supervisor, Paul DiRico, noticed 
a heart-shaped tattoo on her forearm.245 DiRico made repeated demands on 
Connor to cover her tattoo or face discharge.246 Bob Lawrence, a salesperson in 
the same office, was neither asked nor required to cover up a visible United 
States Navy tattoo on his wrist or forearm.247 Connor refused to cover her tattoo 
because Lawrence was allowed to freely exhibit his tattoo in the office.248 DiRico 
advised Connor that if she did not cover up her tattoo by the end of the week, 
she would be fired.249 
The supervisor’s reasons for the differential treatment track the gendered 
historical stereotypes about tattoos in the United States, discussed in Part I, 
regarding the negative sexualization of women with tattoos and the male use of 
tattoos in warrior and patriotic settings.250 DiRico indicated to Connor and later 
to the MCAD that he wanted Connor to cover up her tattoo because women 
with tattoos “symbolize[d] that she was either a prostitute, or on drugs, or from 
a broken home.”251 Also, drawing from concerns about community standards, 
DiRico added that “customers would have a bad feeling about [Hub] when they 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. 750 N.E.2d 523 (Mass. App. Ct. July 12, 2001) (unpublished table opinion), available at 2001 
WL 789248. See also Pechman, supra note 17, at 4; Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, Company 
Guilty of Gender Discrimination in Forbidding Exposed Tattoo, LAB. & EMP. REV. (2002), http://www. 
Eapdlaw.com/newsstand/ detail.aspx?news=140#8 (last visited Oct. 26, 2006). 
 242. Hub Folding Box Co., 2001 WL 789248, at ***1 nn.1–2. 
 243. Id. at ***1. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at ***1 n.1. 
 248. Id. at ***1. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See supra notes 46–58, 62, 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 251. Hub Folding Box Co., 2001 WL 789248, at ***1. 
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saw [Connor’s] tattoo.”252 Conversely, DiRico stated that Lawrence was not 
asked to cover his tattoo because it was a “symbol of his heroism”253 and showed 
he was “a hero who had served his country.”254 Underlying DiRico’s statements 
are assumptions that the community attributes positive connotations of 
patriotism and courage to men with tattoos, while women with tattoos are 
viewed as having “loose” morals that would tarnish the company’s image.255 
Before the week’s end, Connor filed an action with the MCAD based on sex 
discrimination.256 When she told DiRico that she had filed the action, he fired 
her.257 DiRico followed Connor out of his office and the two exchanged 
profanities.258 Subsequently, DiRico claimed that he had fired her for 
insubordination and for vulgar language, but the MCAD credited Connor’s 
testimony that she was fired for her tattoo and that the verbal altercation 
amounted to a pretext.259 
In Hub Folding Box Co., the court did not apply the community standards 
approach nor did it weigh the totality of the company’s dress and grooming 
policies under the unequal burdens test. Rather, the court used standard 
disparate treatment principles found in earlier precedent, requiring the 
employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Connor’s 
discharge.260 The court found the following: 
Hub’s reason for having in essence two standards respecting tattoos, one for 
men and one for women, stemmed from DiRico’s beliefs that (1) women with 
tattoos are ne’er-do-wells whereas men with tattoos are heroes and (2) Hub’s 
customers would not like seeing tattoos on a female employee. This reasoning, 
which caused Connor to feel unequal to her male counterparts, is not a 
legitimate basis for treating men and women differently in the workplace. In 
fact, it is outdated gender stereotypes such as these which antidiscrimination 
laws were designed to eradicate.261 
In rendering its decision, the appeals court followed past precedent that requires 
employers to either provide equal workplace treatment of men and women, like 
Riggs, or to offer a valid, nondiscriminatory business reason for its challenged 
conduct.262 Without citing Price Waterhouse, the court considered the employer’s 
claimed reasoning for its differential treatment through an examination of 
gender stereotypes.263 Applying the rationale of Price Waterhouse, the court found 
that both of the employer’s reasons—gendered views of tattoos and the possible 
 
 252. See id.; supra notes 221, 230 and accompanying text; infra notes 307–10 and accompanying 
text. 
 253. Hub Folding Box Co., 2001 WL 789248, at ***2. 
 254. Id. at ***1. 
 255. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 256. Hub Folding Box Co., 2001 WL 789248, at ***1. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at ***2 n.3. 
 260. Id. at ***2. 
 261. Id. (citations omitted). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
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negative reaction of customers—were grounded in gender stereotypes which 
did not support the employer’s assertion of a nondiscriminatory business 
reason.264 Therefore, the court held that the employer’s retaliatory discharge was 
improper and that the Plaintiff had suffered from unequal treatment in the 
workplace because of stereotypical gender views of her tattoo.265 
Under this approach, cases that involve gender-distinct treatment for 
piercings would be illegal either as violating the traditional disparate treatment 
principle of equal treatment, discussed in Riggs, or as deriving from 
stereotypical thinking about men wearing earrings, which implicates Price 
Waterhouse. However, courts uniformly require men to perform their proper 
gender roles as regards earrings,266 comporting with stereotypes that real men 
“do not accessorize”267 and pointing to the kind of biased community standards 
that the Hub Folding Box Co. court rejected as illegal. As is common in these 
cases, men are adequately undertaking their job tasks. However, once they 
insert an earring, they are upsetting the gendered status quo in the workplace 
and are risking discharge because of their failure to perform their assigned 
gender roles.268 
For example, in Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc.,269 a male teacher 
with two years of successful service was fired when he wore a small gold 
earring loop to school before classes had begun.270 He contended that the school 
fired him because his wearing of an earring did not comply with the school’s 
stereotypical view that males “should have a virile rather than an effeminate 
appearance.”271 Strailey brought his action under Title VII as sexual orientation 
discrimination.272 Based on earlier precedent, the court dismissed the claim 
because sexual orientation is not protected under Title VII. The court also 
broadened this determination by stating that “discrimination because of 
effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality . . . or 
transsexualism . . . does not fall within the purview of TitleVII.”273 
Similarly, in the recent case of Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc.,274 a court 
considered a male donning an earring when neither claims of effeminacy or 
sexual orientation were in dispute.275 In that case, the employee, Michael 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See, e.g., Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. Civ. A. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 
2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a policy prohibiting males from wearing earrings 
was not gender discrimination); Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 
1979); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit 
Union, No. 86 CV 1944, 1987 WL 9687 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (upholding employer policy 
prohibiting males from wearing earrings finding no gender discrimination), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1086 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 267. Flynn, supra note 203, at 401. See infra notes 295–302 and accompanying text. 
 268. See infra notes 295–302 and accompanying text. 
 269. 608 F.2d at 327. 
 270. Id. at 331. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 331–32. 
 273. Id. 
 274. 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003). 
 275. Id. at 801–02. 
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Pecenka, had worked for the employer in 1991 and then again starting in 
February 2000 as a part-time driver at the company warehouse.276 His ability to 
competently handle his job responsibilities resulted in his being promoted in 
2001 to a full-time position.277 Pecenka had always worn a stud earring 
throughout all of his various levels of employment with Fareway.278 
A few days after his 2001 promotion, his supervisor told him to remove or 
cover the stud with a bandage under an unwritten policy that allowed females, 
but not males, to wear earrings.279 Pecenka refused and Fareway terminated his 
employment.280 He brought an action under Title VII and Iowa anti-
discrimination statutes, claiming illegal gender discrimination.281 
Making an analogy to earlier grooming cases on hair length, the court 
determined that there was no gender discrimination under Title VII or Iowa 
law.282 The court stated that Title VII allows “grooming codes that reflect 
customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant impact on 
employment opportunities,” and therefore such codes do not amount to gender 
discrimination.283 This assertion of de minimis impact284 rings especially hollow 
because Pecenka lost his job not because of poor performance, but solely because 
he wore an earring, just as he had always done while a Fareway employee.285 
The court added that state and federal anti-discrimination laws were meant “to 
stop the perpetuation of sexist or chauvinistic attitudes in employment,”286 
suggesting that only women should be allowed to challenge gendered 
employment policies. 
Reworking the well-trodden ground found in other cases dealing with 
racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination, the court determined that there was no 
“sex-plus” discrimination because no immutable trait was at issue.287 The court 
stated flatly that “[w]earing an earring stud is not an immutable 
characteristic.”288 The court also indicated that Pecenka had not argued that the 
codes were sexist or chauvinistic or that any fundamental rights—such as child-
bearing or marriage were involved289—to support a “sex-plus” claim.290 
Certainly possessing a tattoo, as in Hub Folding Box Co., is neither an 
immutable characteristic nor a fundamental right, yet protections were afforded 
to that female plaintiff using the Price Waterhouse rationale on gender 
stereotyping. Had Pecenka contended that the codes were based on sexist 
 
 276. Id. at 802. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 802. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 804. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 804. 
 287. Id. at 805. See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 288. Pecenka, 672 N.W.2d at 805. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See infra notes 160–201 and accompanying text. 
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stereotypes about gendered roles, it is still likely that the court would have 
rejected his claim under the notion of acceptable community standards found in 
the hair length cases. Therefore, sexualized views of a woman with body art are 
seen as illegal stereotyping, while the prohibition of piercings for men are found 
to be acceptable under community standards. Despite Justice Brennan’s 
optimistic predictions in Price Waterhouse, gender stereotypes persist in 
grooming and dress cases, as exemplified in the new round of cases dealing 
with body art work rules—particularly those that follow the trend of other 
grooming and dress cases, which elevate the masculine and subordinate the 
feminine. Clearly, courts continue to demand that male employees play their 
proper gender roles, while women are given more leeway to take on behavior 
traditionally coded as masculine, as evidenced by both Riggs and Hub Folding 
Box Co. 
III. UNMASKING INCONSISTENCIES IN BODY ART WORK RULES 
In addressing body art work rules, courts have split their take on gender 
performance: in part, requiring equal treatment as to tattoos, which are socially-
encoded as male in Riggs and Hub Folding Box, while allowing men to be treated 
differently, with piercings being encoded as female in Strailey and Pecenka. 
Furthermore, the courts allow women to contravene popularly held views about 
females with tattoos, while blocking efforts of men to violate society’s gender 
boundaries as to earrings. Yet stepping back, it is clear that these decisions are 
actually expressing two over-arching themes that apply across the board to 
other types of gender grooming cases, such as those involving beards, make-up, 
hair length, and attire. The first theme is the judiciary’s implicit acceptance of 
the notion of “professional image” as comporting with dominant white, 
masculine, heterosexual, and middle-class views of proper appearance, which 
has implications not only for gender, but race, ethnic and religious performance 
cases.291 Secondly, another thread is the courts’ continued approval of employees 
bending their gender toward “masculine” traits, while any behavior that 
comports with “feminine” traits is rejected and subordinated as lacking value in 
the workplace.292 
Employer dress and grooming codes are important forms of dominance in 
the workplace and in the society at large.293 In a workplace saturated with 
 
 291. Engle, supra note 18, at 329–30, 354; Klare, supra note 18, at 1404–12; Rich, supra note 18, at 
1194–96; Yuracko, supra note 18, at 63. See also Mroz, supra note 148, at 172–74 (contending that courts 
view mainstream religions as presumptively religious and worthy of Title VII protections, while 
minority beliefs are subject to a more searching analysis and are less likely to receive Title VII 
protections). 
 292. Case, supra note 208, at 3, 33–34, 65–67; Flynn, supra note 203, at 399; McGinley, supra note 
206, at 365, 409–10. Prof. McGinley notes that in the male-dominated workplace men “often 
denigrate women and other males who do not conform to gender norms, using gender specific 
language that equates inferiority with being female or feminine.” These terms are intended to belittle 
a male victim’s masculinity and dignity using words viewed as female slurs such as “bitch” or 
“pussy,” that “conflate a lack of masculinity with homosexuality.” These derogatory remarks 
illustrate “a symbolic blurring with femininity, [that] maintains the superiority of the masculine over 
the feminine, of men over women.” Id. at 409. 
 293. Klare, supra note 18, at 1398. 
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masculine values,294 male professional dress is “unmarked” and viewed as the 
baseline for professional appearance.295 Conversely, women as well as racial and 
ethnic minorities are considered to be “marked” because of the wide range of 
hairstyles and clothing choices available to them.296 Indeed, gender, dress, and 
body adornment (or the lack thereof) has long been part of the practices that 
produce “properly” gendered bodies. In the United States, women have been 
traditionally associated with this kind of gender marking. They are marked by 
degrees of “proper” performance of their gender roles through a series of 
choices.297 
In an often-reprinted 1993 New York Times Magazine article on gender 
marking in the workplace, sociolinguist Deborah Tannen claimed that women 
were marked on a scale of femininity depending on their choices of clothing, 
hairstyle, makeup, and accessories.298 Any choices they made were read by 
others as comments on their adherence to social and cultural expectations about 
femininity. Of course, “[s]ome days you just want to get dressed and go about 
your business,” Prof. Tannen noted, “[b]ut if you’re a woman you can’t, because 
there is no unmarked woman.”299 As men had a fairly standard corporate 
uniform—of dark suit, flat shoes, short hair, and an absence of accessories—
Tannen deemed them unmarked.300 
Commenting on the gender marking associated with women’s workplace 
attire and grooming choices, Prof. Tannen concluded, “[t]here is no women’s 
style that can be called standard [or] that says nothing about her. The range of 
women’s hairstyles is staggering, but a woman whose hair has no particular 
style is perceived as not caring about how she looks, which can disqualify her 
from many positions.”301 Indeed, all choices a woman makes about her 
appearance mark her: 
If a woman’s clothing is tight or revealing (in other words, sexy), it sends a 
message—an intended one of wanting to be attractive, but also a possibly 
unintended one of availability. If her clothes are not sexy, that too sends a 
message, lent meaning by the knowledge that they could have been. There are 
thousands of cosmetic products from which women can choose and myriad 
ways of applying them. Yet no makeup at all is anything but unmarked. Some 
men see it as a hostile refusal to please them.302 
 
 294. Collinson & Hearn, supra note 206, at 146; McGinley, supra note 206, at 364–65, 386. 
 295. Deborah Tannen, Wears Jump Suit. Sensible Shoes. Uses Husband’s Last Name, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., June 20, 1993, at 52. See Case, supra note 208, at 20–22. 
 296. Tannen, supra note 295, at 18, 52. See Case, supra note 208, at 21; infra notes 303–10 and 
accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text. 
 298. Tannen, supra note 295, at 18, 52. 
 299. Id. at 54. 
 300. Id. Since her article’s publication in 1993, men are still more unmarked than women in the 
workplace, but changing norms about acceptable hair length and a booming business of male beauty 
products and accessories (most notably the mainstreaming of the male earring) have made men 
more marked than before. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 304–05 and 
accompanying text. 
 301. Id. at 52. 
 302. Id. 
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Similarly, racial and ethnic performative acts relative to grooming and 
dress are also viewed as “marked” compared to the dominant white values of 
the workplace.303 As Prof. Rich clearly states, “the rules employers enforce in 
race/ethnicity performance cases typically are designed to quash expressions of 
ethnic or racial difference in favor of maintaining an ‘unmarked’ baseline 
culture of the workplace, which is typically Anglo or European.”304 An employee 
wearing dreadlocks, all-braided hairstyles, or a headwrap challenges the 
cultural hegemony of dominant groups in the workplace by rejecting the 
“unmarked” baseline, and disrupts “the pleasant fiction that all workers share 
the same aesthetic values.”305 Furthermore, when dominant group members 
adopt “marked” racial and ethnic dress and grooming, it can become an 
increased source of anxiety in the workplace, since this conduct suggests the 
cultural penetration of subordinate or lower-status cultures into dominant 
groups.306 
Consequently, unmarked grooming and dress becomes viewed as a higher 
status, while the marked dress and grooming associated with women as well as 
racial and ethnic minority groups are viewed as a lower status. Employers may 
push for conformity with “unmarked” norms in order to protect the workplace 
environment and its associated products or services from being “infected” with 
lower status attributes,307 including historically-disdained tattoos, facial 
piercings, and male earrings.308 Negative labels of “unprofessional,” 
“inappropriate,” or “dirty” become associated with marked dress and 
grooming, reinforcing perceptions of the inferiority of women and minorities.309 
These perceptions can begin to reflect themselves in an employee’s internalized 
feelings of worthlessness, lost dignity, and self-loathing.310 
In this environment, organizations become focused on the creation and 
retention of masculine identities and the power associated with them.311 
Masculine dominance is seen as “the flight from the feminine.”312 Femininity 
holds lower status in this hierarchy, with all things gendered as feminine being 
 
 303. Klare, supra note 18, at 1398, 1411–14; Rich, supra note 18, at 1218. 
 304. Rich, supra note 18, at 1218. 
 305. Id. at 1190–91. See Klare, supra note 18, at 1413–14. 
 306. Rich, supra note 18, at 1159–61. 
 307. Case, supra note 208, at 35; Rich, supra note 18, at 1190, 1249, 1253. Prof. Case states that 
males vigilantly “police gender boundaries against any intrusion of the feminine” to thwart the 
“taint” of feminine inferiority. In addition, subordinating the feminine may be the only way left “to 
define masculinity at all, there being little or nothing left exclusive to men in this culture.” Case, 
supra note 208, at 36. 
 308. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 226–27 (discussing suppression of individual and cultural 
identities as to tattooing in corporate grooming policies). 
 309. Id. at 224; Rich, supra note 18, at 1249, 1253. 
 310. Rich, supra note 18, at 1193, 1195. 
 311. Collinson & Hearn, supra note 206, at 148; McGinley, supra note 206, at 364–65, 371–72. 
Kimmel notes that men are powerful as a group, even if they do not feel individually powerful. 
Kimmel, supra note 209, at 282. Kimmel adds that the practices of masculinity position women and 
minorities as the “others” against which men must project their dominant identities. Id. at 280. 
Kimmel contends that homophobia ultimately spawns sexism and racism. Id. 
 312. Kimmel, supra note 209, at 273. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
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subordinated and devalued in the workplace.313 Transgender, gay, and 
effeminate men are considered to be assimilated into femininity, and thus are 
relegated to the bottom of the workplace hierarchy.314 Courts protect the right of 
women to dress and act in a masculine manner, while upholding employer 
codes that penalize men for acting in feminine ways.315 The female with a tattoo 
is following traditionally dominant masculine behavior, while the men with 
feminine accessories, like earrings, are losing status in the workplace hierarchy. 
As Prof. Case asserts, society fears “sissies” more than “tomboys” because 
“masculinity in a girl is approved while femininity in a boy is not only 
troublesome, but a marker of homosexual orientation.”316 
Sociologist Holly Devor also describes how, for instance, “the patriarchal 
gender schema currently in use in mainstream North American society reserves 
highly valued attributes for males.”317 She theorizes that the “ideology 
[underlying this schema] postulates that the cultural superiority of males is a 
natural outgrowth of the innate predisposition of males toward aggression and 
dominance.”318 Women accordingly are associated with “modes of dress, 
movement, speech and action which communicate weakness, dependency, 
ineffectualness, availability for sexual or emotional service, and sensitivity to the 
needs of others.”319 In contrast, masculinity is associated with “‘toughness, 
confidence, and self-reliance.’”320 To maintain this “‘aura of aggression, violence, 
and daring,’” men must “conscientiously avoid anything associated with 
femininity.”321 Men who purposely adorn themselves with a traditionally-female 
accessory such as an earring unsettle the schema’s binaristic gender division, 
especially given that in the United States fashion in general and accessories in 
particular have been coded most often as feminine. 
If gender marking has been historically associated with femininity, the fact 
that it is being extended to masculinity is a source of anxiety for those for whom 
masculinity and femininity are assumed to be natural binaries.322 This anxiety is 
 
 313. Case supra note 208, at 3, 22–23, 33–34. 
 314. Id. at 2–3, 30–31; R.W. Connell, The Social Organization of Masculinity, in THE MASCULINITIES 
READER 39–40 (Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank J. Barrett eds., 2001); McGinley, supra note 206, at 
365–67, 408–10. 
 315. Case, supra note 208, at 2–3, 26–27, 30–31; McGinley, supra note 206, at 365–67, 408–09. 
 316. Case, supra note 208, at 27. Quoting psychologist Robert Brannon, Kimmel states that one 
aspect of the definition of manhood is “1. ‘No Sissy Stuff.’ One may never do anything that even 
remotely suggests femininity. Masculinity is the relentless repudiation of the feminine.” Kimmel, 
supra note 209, at 272. 
 317. HOLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING 50 (Ind. Univ. Press 1989). 
 318. Id. at 50–51. 
 319. Id. at 51. 
 320. Id. at 52 (quoting JOSEPH H. PLECK, THE MYTH OF MASCULINITY 139 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 
1981)). 
 321. Id. (quoting PLECK, supra note 320, at 139). See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
 322. McGinley, supra note 206, at 376–77. See generally MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: 
CROSSDRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY (1991) (offers a historical and textual overview of the 
cultural function of transvestitism and examines anxieties produced when the lines between two 
categories, such as male/female or heterosexual/ homosexual, become blurred); STEVEN COHAN, 
MASKED MEN: MASCULINITY AND THE MOVIES IN THE FIFTIES (Ind. Univ. Press 1997) (uncovers the 
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expressed in the oft-cited Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 
reviewing a gendered hair-length policy, in which the court, in a seemingly 
panicked hysteria, warns about the dangers of applying Title VII to invalidate 
gendered grooming codes: 
If this interpretation of the Act is expanded to its logical extent, employers 
would be powerless to prevent extremes in dress and behavior totally 
unacceptable according to prevailing standards and customs recognized by 
society. For example, if it be mandated that men must be allowed to wear 
shoulder length hair, despite employer disfavor, because the employer allows 
women to wear hair that length, then it must logically follow that men, if they 
choose, could not be prevented by the employer from wearing dresses to work if 
the employer permitted women to wear dresses . . . . Continuing the logical 
development of plaintiff’s proposition, it would not be at all illogical to include 
lipstick, eye shadow, earrings, and other items of typical female attire among the 
items which an employer would be powerless to restrict to female attire and 
bedeckment. It would be patently ridiculous to presume that Congress ever 
intended such result . . . .323 
The Willingham court expressed a fear of men gender-bending toward feminine 
traits, but not of females titling toward masculine attire. These fears are 
exacerbated by the corporate male whose gender and sexuality are invisible 
until he marks them as ambiguous with the insertion of jewelry into his ear. The 
male earring causes the wearer’s dress and body to become a distraction and, 
thus, marks him by gender in a way that only women used to be marked. As 
soon as he puts an earring in his ear, the male employee feminizes himself in 
that his appearance is suddenly sending a gendered message—that it is a 
highly-ambiguous one is even more unsettling. Once he marks his body by 
gender, he calls attention to the gender of all the other formerly unmarked male 
bodies in the office. Typically, Prof. Tannen said, male appearance “needed and 
attracted no attention.”324 If his earring is attracting attention, the male employee 
can no longer maintain an unmarked appearance. 
Prof. Butler addresses this issue of how a person enacts his or her gender 
and puts (or does not put) his or her body on display in particular ways: “One is 
not simply a body, but, in some very key sense, one does one’s body and, 
indeed, one does one’s body differently from one’s contemporaries and from 
one’s embodied predecessors and successors as well.”325 Gender is not an 
outward expression of some interior, “natural” self. As Prof. Butler puts it, 
“gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses or disguises an 
interior ‘self,’ whether that ‘self’ is conceived as sexed or not. As performance 
which is performative, gender is an ‘act,’ broadly construed, which constructs 
the social fiction of its own psychological interiority.”326 
 
anxieties beneath representation of hegemonic masculinity in American film); BUTLER, supra note 
210, at 33, 122, 141. 
 323. 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). But see supra note 
220 and accompanying text. 
 324. Tannen, supra note 295, at 18. 
 325. Butler, supra note 206, at 272. 
 326. Id. at 279. 
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In enacting gender in certain ways, a person is only doing what others have 
done before. These gendered conventions, Prof. Butler contends, are part of a 
history that exists independent of the person performing them: “[G]ender is an 
act which has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the particular actors 
who make use of it, but which requires individual actors in order to be 
actualized and reproduced as reality once again.”327 Prof. Butler thus argues that 
gendered identity is a kind of performance without an original. 
Prof. Butler thus argues that gendered identity is a kind of performance 
without an original. Men and women “compel the body to conform to an 
historical idea of ‘Woman’” or ‘Man,’ “materialize” themselves “in obedience to 
historically delimited possibility,” and abide by a “tacit collective agreement to 
perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions.”328 
The problem with the male earring is that its significance in the binaristic 
gender schema is not immediately recognizable. Whatever the male employee 
intends by sporting an earring, Prof. Butler’s theory suggests, is not as relevant 
as the way in which such gender marking has historically been interpreted. 
Standards are maintained by the repetition of performative acts of gender. Those 
who do not conform to the concept of the properly-gendered body are policed 
by others, especially employers and co-workers. Although gender norms are 
artificial constructs, they have actual effects, especially given how strictly they 
are enforced. Indeed, that which has come to be regarded as “natural” behavior 
is actually the result, Prof. Butler argues, of explicit and implicit coercion.329 
By banning the male earring, employers and the judges who uphold their 
dress code policies participate in this coercion of male employees, reminding 
them of the expectation that they follow the repertoire of practices that mark 
them as “properly” gendered. The earring cases confirm that there are still social 
consequences of confusing gender boundaries. Employees are given a gender 
performance review and are penalized for not following the standard, socially-
agreed-upon scripts. They are encouraged to regulate their own behaviors and 
appearances (as well as that of their peers) in relation to a dualistic gender 
system in which people are defined and define themselves according to 
conventional notions of what it means to be either male or female. The most 
desirable employee in this environment will be the one whose gender 
“performance complies with social expectations.”330 
Through a male-earring ban, a workplace reinforces the dominant gender 
assumption that women wear earrings and men leave their bodies unadorned, 
as well as the implicit premise that women are “naturally” penetrable and men 
are “naturally” impenetrable. These binaries help explain the workplace 
tolerance for tattoos, although at first it might not seem to do so. Tattoos are 
body adornments that are typically coded as masculine, associated as they are 
with toughness and aggression, and often evoking military associations. Yet, a 
woman who sports a tattoo is not read as more masculine. Instead, as Prof. 
 
 327. Id. at 272. 
 328. Butler, supra note 206, at 273. 
 329. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 3 (1993). See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 330. Butler, supra note 206, at 278. 
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Tannen has noted, everything a female does to her body and appearance is read 
in terms of femininity. This marking is clearest in the designation of the female 
tattoo, especially one on the lower back, as a “tramp stamp.”331 This slang 
descriptor reveals that the tattoo is being read in terms of the female’s display of 
her sexual availability to men. 
According to Prof. Devor, because this association is already part of the 
dominant conception of femininity,332 the female tattoo does not provoke the 
kind of gender anxiety the male earring does. If a male earring ban was about 
restricting employees from displaying a too casual appearance, then male 
tattoos would also likely fall under the ban. Instead, courts have upheld the 
male employee’s right to display a tattoo in Hub Folding Box Co. and Red Robin. 
The difference between the two body adornments, of course, is that the male 
tattoo is unambiguously masculine and therefore, it functions to reinforce 
normative gender assumptions, particularly those about masculine toughness 
and impenetrability. 
As Prof. Case stated, 
[w]hen individuals diverge from the gender expectations for their sex—when a 
woman displays masculine characteristics or a man feminine ones—
discrimination against her is now treated as sex discrimination while his 
behavior is generally viewed as a marker for homosexual orientation and may 
not receive protection from discrimination. . . . This differential treatment has 
important implications for feminist theory. It marks the continuing devaluation, 
in life and in law, of qualities deemed feminine. The man who exhibits feminine 
qualities is doubly despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for 
descending from his masculine gender privilege to do so. The masculine woman 
is today more readily accepted. Wanting to be masculine is understandable; it 
can be a step up for a woman, and the qualities associated with masculinity are 
also associated with success. . . . We are in danger of substituting for prohibited 
sex discrimination a still acceptable gender discrimination, that is to say, 
discrimination against the stereotypically feminine, especially when manifested 
by men, but also when manifested by women.333 
One might argue that these dress code distinctions are merely practical matters, 
given that it is easier to remove an earring than a tattoo. If it is a purely practical 
matter, however, why is such a fuss made over this tiny accessory? Reading the 
cases through the lens of Prof. Butler’s theories shows that the effect of male-
earring removal is to return the male employee to a position of unmarked 
dominant masculinity; in contrast, whether the male employee with the tattoo 
displays or covers it, he still occupies an unambiguously masculine position. 
Similarly, whether displaying or covering her tattoo, the female employee’s 
position in a gendered binary remains unchanged. Males properly performing 
their gender roles, through displays of masculine-encoded tattoos, do not 
 
 331. In WEDDING CRASHERS (New Line Cinema 2005), Jeremy Grey (played by actor Vince 
Vaughn) establishes the continuing association between tattoo and sexual promiscuity with his 
comment about a woman: “Tattoo on the lower back . . . might as well be a bull’s eye.” See also supra 
notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 332. DEVOR, supra note 317, at 51. 
 333. Case, supra note 208, at 2–3. 
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disrupt the unmarked position of men in society and in the workplace. In 
contrast, males who do not properly perform their gender roles, by wearing 
earrings or adorning themselves with other feminine accessories, disrupt the 
unmarked position of men and suffer social and legal consequences for it. 
However, females retain their same gender marked designations, regardless of 
whether or not they perform in accordance with societal demands about 
traditional female beauty or bedeck themselves in masculine attire and 
accessories. 
It is not likely that any dress code would explicitly legislate about female 
body art, given that, in acknowledging how their bodies are marked, courts 
have already provided females with protection from gendered discrimination in 
the workplace. In other words, unlike the male earring wearer, a female 
employee whose gender is obviously and perhaps even purposefully ambiguous 
is supposed to be protected by the law. Following Prof. Butler’s theories, 
extending the protection of the law to the male earring wearer might suggest 
that men are in need of such protection and, therefore, are not naturally 
empowered.334 To acknowledge that he is in need of gendered protection would, 
in turn, undercut the assumption that gender is a “woman’s problem.” 
Interpreting law to protect heterosexual males vulnerable to gender marking 
would feminize them and position them as weak and in need of protection. If 
we follow Prof. Butler’s logic, creating an association between masculinity and 
vulnerability in law would be problematic given the ways “[j]uridical power 
inevitably produces what it claims merely to represent.”335 If, as Prof. Butler says, 
subjects are formed by the kinds of protection afforded to them, then it follows 
that heterosexual males are not extended gendered protection under the law. 
That workplaces allow the female tattoo and ban the male earring is not 
surprising because such a dress code reinforces a system in which women 
primarily function as objects to be looked at, while men are subjects—those 
expected to look and to act. These judicial decisions produce as well as reinforce 
a division between the sexes. While the gender of female employees is always 
visible, according to Prof. Tannen’s theory, the problem with male earring 
wearers is that they put the tenuousness of the construction of dominant 
masculinity on display. By making the employee’s masculinity more 
ambiguous, the earring makes apparent the ways the standard corporate attire is 
not some expression of natural masculinity, but rather a performance of some 
idea of masculinity. More to the point, the male earring wearer ruins the 
impression that masculinity (and by extension corporate power) is natural.336 If 
masculinity is not natural, then, by extension, neither is the masculine corporate 
ideal.337 The male earring threatens the coherence of masculine power and makes 
 
 334. See supra notes 317–24 and accompanying text. 
 335. BUTLER’S BODIES, supra note 329, at 2. 
 336. Brittan, supra note 205, at 53; McGinley, supra note 206, at 365, 376–77. 
 337. Id. at 375–77, 386. The association of corporations with masculinity has been examined by 
numerous cultural historians. See generally GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS AND CIVILIZATION: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880–1917, at 11–12 (1995); DANA D. 
NELSON, NATIONAL MANHOOD: CAPITALIST CITIZENSHIP AND THE IMAGINED FRATERNITY OF WHITE 
MEN (1998); ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE & SOCIETY IN THE 
GILDED AGE (Eric Foner ed., Hill and Wang 1982). 
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it “radically unstable”; the more the male earring is seized upon as 
inappropriate, the more it reveals such power as illusory.338 That masculine 
power is, to borrow Prof. Butler’s phrasing, “always in the act of elaborating 
itself is evidence that it is perpetually at risk[;] . . . it ‘knows’ its own possibility 
of becoming undone.”339 Of course, eradicating male earring-wearing from the 
workplace does not shore up male power, but it exposes the naturalness of male 
power as illusory. As corporate power has typically been synonymous with 
male power, this exposé is particularly dangerous: Instead of naturally 
emanating from male bodies, masculine power is revealed to be culturally 
constructed, to exist both in a binary with femininity and on a continuum of 
acceptable to unacceptable behavior codes. There cannot be an aberrant earring-
wearing male without a normal non-earring wearing male. 
IV. REFOCUSING ON JOB PERFORMANCE 
In body art work rule disputes, gender performance often overrides 
concerns about proper job performance, especially when men seek to display 
traditionally feminine accessories. With the adoption of written and unwritten 
body art work rules, employees find that many employers seem more concerned 
with upholding dominant expectations of gender performance than evaluating 
the quality of an employee’s job performance. Rather than balance the interests 
of employers and employees, courts have primarily given in to employer 
demands for proper gender performance instead of focusing on the adoption of 
dress and grooming codes that relate to actual job performance. Courts have 
often failed to rein in employers who reward gender performance over job 
performance, especially when men are tilting toward characteristics encoded as 
feminine. 
Similar to previous decisions upholding other workplace grooming and 
dress policies, the judiciary has played an important role in legitimizing, rather 
than challenging, both discriminatory and stereotypical behavior regarding 
body art work rules.340 Courts allow employers to police the boundaries of 
acceptable grooming and dress in ways that maintain the status quo of 
dominance in the social and workplace hierarchies.341 Yet the courts do so in 
ways that often outwardly suggest neutrality or objectivity, but in actuality 
largely convey antipathy for lower-status groups.342 These decisions consistently 
marginalize and subordinate women as well as racial and ethnic minority 
 
 338. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY 
THEORIES 23 (Diana Fuss ed., Routledge 1991). 
 339. Id.; Collinson & Hearn, supra note 206, at 148–49 (contending that masculine identity in the 
workplace is much more fragile and precarious than it appears on the surface). 
 340. Klare, supra note 18, at 1419–21, 1431–32; Rich, supra note 18, at 1156, 1170–71. Prof. Rich 
criticizes judges for “unarticulated knee jerk” responses to unfamiliar racial and ethnic identity 
practices, suggesting that they should make efforts to educate themselves about the substance and 
significance of these performative acts. Id. at 1170–71. 
 341. Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32; Rich supra note 18, at 1156; Vojdik, supra note 2203, at 92. 
Fearing a loss of status, co-workers also police grooming and dress, be it racial or ethnic 
performances or the display of tattoos and piercings. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 221–23; Rich, 
supra note 18, at 1160–62, 1190, 1268–69. 
 342. Rich supra note 18, at 1193–94. 
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groups, transgendered persons, and gender-ambiguous men in the workplace, 
while reaffirming the status quo of heterosexual white male power and 
dominance in the workplace hierarchy.343 
Gender, racial, and ethnic appearances that may contest the status quo by 
not conforming to dominant-group norms can be punished swiftly without fear 
of retribution through anti-discrimination litigation.344 Therefore, employees 
from lower-status groups must be willing to shed their racial, cultural, and 
gender identities or risk losing their jobs.345 Courts myopically view these issues 
as simply matters of choice: choose to follow the employer’s code or choose to 
work elsewhere.346 Courts conveniently ignore the coercive effect of economic 
pressures and the resulting constraints on human agency, making it difficult—if 
not impossible—to just leave a job and find another.347 
Prof. Klare contends that “[t]he genius of appearance law as discipline lies 
in indirection and decentralization,” which provides us with the illusion of 
freedom of choice. He notes that, although our society claims that we are free 
from government or religious edicts on grooming and dress, the law provides 
employers with the power to adopt dress and grooming codes and “to punish 
nonconformists.” He states: 
[B]y delegating power to employers (and other authority figures), appearance 
law raises the cost of nonconformity . . . . So the system is decentralized, 
variegated, and flexible . . . . And precisely because appearance regulation is so 
decentralized, even obscure, this persistent conformism is experienced as 
 
 343. FRANKE, supra note 5, at 39–40; Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32; Raskin, supra note 227, at 
265; Vojdik, supra note 2203, at 92. Prof. Vojdik indicated that social dominance remains at the heart 
of gender discrimination. Although gender social relations may be evolving, notions of masculinity 
and femininity “still preserve gender as hierarchy.” In the workplace, she indicates that the 
elimination of facially discriminatory practices has simply replaced “[f]ormal exclusion . . . with 
another form of social control and distinction that preserves the relationship of gender domination.” 
Id. Similarly, Prof. Franke posits that ultimately “bodies end up meaning less in the fight for equality 
than the roles, clothing, myths, and stereotypes that transform a vagina into a she.” In assessing 
notions of masculinity/femininity, gender, and sexuality “uncovers the ideology and power 
differentials congealed in these categories.” FRANKE, supra note 5, at 39–40. 
 344. Butler, supra note 206, at 279; Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32, 1436–37; Rich supra note 18, at 
1166–68. 
 345. Rich supra note 18, at 1163–64, 1244–45. In the context of racial and ethnic performative acts, 
Prof. Rich discusses how the coercive effect of grooming policies for lower-status groups is 
fundamentally unfair: 
Why should a person be required to shed passively acquired racially or ethnically marked 
mannerisms when they have no bearing on her potential performance of the job at issue? 
Indeed, once a heavily-marked job seeker is denied an opportunity because of these 
passive traits and behaviors, she faces an important decision. Now that she is aware that 
her community’s practices are undesirable, she must decide whether to shed these 
attributes, a decision that may be experienced as a truly traumatic betrayal of her concept 
of self . . . Many may feel a need to emphasize racial/ethnic pride as a result of this 
dignitary injury. It should offend our basic notions of fairness to leave these individuals at 
the mercy of an employer’s subjective views about the relative value of different ethnic 
communities. Indeed, after two decades of identity politics, it seems unfair to tell this 
worker that she must assimilate in order to fairly compete in society. 
Id. at 1163–64. 
 346. Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32; Rich supra note 18, at 1244–45. 
 347. Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32, 1436–37; Rich supra note 18, at 1244–45. 
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“natural” rather than as a socially constructed artifact deeply influenced by law. 
Thus, appearance law functions both distributively (assigning coercive power to 
employers) and ideologically—it makes contingent, alterable outcomes appear to 
be chosen free of coercive direction, or perhaps just inevitable, “the way things 
are.”348 
Just because that is the way things are certainly does not mean that is the way 
things must continue to be. 
Courts have gyrated for decades with innumerable schemes to try to justify 
gender differences in grooming and dress codes—sameness versus difference, 
immutable versus volitional, natural versus artificial, equal versus unequal 
burdens, community standards versus individual autonomy, fundamental 
rights versus personal preferences. These same tortured dances occur whenever 
employees seek to perform their racial and ethnic identities in the workplace. 
Even with the accommodationist language of Title VII, employees must fight to 
be able to perform their religious identities through dress and grooming. Instead 
of anti-discrimination law balancing the interests of employees and employers, 
it has become largely a one-way street in which courts kowtow to employer 
demands for nearly unfettered discretion and the perpetuation of a damaging 
status quo.349 
What has long been missing from the mix is a focus on individual 
qualifications and workplace performance.350 It is striking that in so many of 
these dress and grooming cases, the discharged or demoted employees were 
successfully performing their jobs. Then one day their world was turned upside 
down because the employer decided to change the rules of the game with a new 
or revised policy, or to enforce some long moribund policy, or to conjure up 
some unwritten code. Prof. Rich notes that the judiciary has become continually 
out of touch with average working people who spend most of their waking 
hours working, and who feel unfairly constrained by dress and grooming codes 
that have little to do with job performance. She states, 
[f]ortunately, the common law’s generous grant of employer autonomy is now 
fundamentally at odds with most Americans’ understanding of the employer-
employee relationship. Because most Americans’ work experience has been 
during the era of federal and state employment protections for race and sex, as 
well as protections based on pregnancy, disability, and religion, they operate 
under the inaccurate perception that the employer-employee relationship 
provides them with some protection from random adverse treatment by 
employers . . . . Stated more simply, the common man no longer finds it natural, 
or “common sense,” that employers should be permitted unilaterally to impose 
their will on workers when cultural interests are at stake. Rather, the new social 
expectation is that when an employer imposes a rule, she will justify her 
decision on some rational, cost-benefit analysis.351 
Under dress and grooming codes, employer classifications should equate 
directly with successful performance of job tasks, not half-baked assumptions 
 
 348. Klare, supra note 18, at 1431–32. See supra notes 343–46 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 293–97, 303–10 and accompanying text. 
 350. Case, supra note 208, at 79; Rich supra note 18, at 1163–64, 1199, 1203, 1241, 1244–45. 
 351. Rich, supra note 18, at 1245–46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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about the reactions of co-workers and customers or strained efforts to maintain 
traditional power and dominance. If workplaces and those court decisions 
interpreting anti-discrimination law emphasized employees’ successful job 
performance—actually doing the job—rather than ensuring that they play their 
gendered roles by adhering to superficial grooming and attire standards, the 
needs and interests of employers, employees, and customers would be better 
served.352 By freeing up long-suppressed diversity, the employers can benefit 
from the release of creative energies for productive purposes353 and better serve a 
broader customer base.354 
It seems a fair bargain to allow employers to expect employees to do their 
jobs if, in turn, employees get a reasonable chance to reflect themselves in their 
grooming and dress, including body modification.355 The fact that Title VII 
explicitly recognizes the notion of reasonably accommodating religious 
performative acts means that flexibility in dress and grooming codes is not only 
possible, but also desirable in a diverse workplace. The parameters of grooming 
and dress codes should be actual and reasonable concerns about job-related 
safety, unlike the imposition of unfair burdens on co-workers or disruptions in 
the workplace environment as discussed in the religious discrimination case of 
Red Robin. The workplace could become a safer place for people to express their 
preferred gender identities (along with racial, ethnic, and religious identities) 
through dress, grooming, and body modification, if the courts keep their eyes on 
the true purpose of Title VII, measuring the legality of workplace policies based 
on their connection to actual job performance. 
The judicial failure to strike a fair balance between employer and employee 
interests allows employers, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to reinforce 
limiting gender binaries. Unfortunately, in the recent body art work rules cases, 
the courts continue to lumber down the same dull path of rewarding gender 
performance over job performance at the expense of qualities culturally marked 
as feminine. Perhaps significant change must await a whole new generation of 
employees who may hold more fluid view of gender boundaries and body 
modification.356 However, eradicating gender stereotypes should not be left up to 
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generational chance. Instead change should be firmly grounded in judicial 
reasoning that strikes down, rather than upholds, harmful gender stereotypes so 
often embodied in employer dress and grooming codes, including body art 
work rules. 
 
are more accepted in the workplace, but that older people view such practices are “trashy” and 
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